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This paper investigates the value relevance of segment earnings in railroad companies.  Operating profits in 
transportation and real estate business are value relevant.  While operating losses in leisure business contains 
large noise, positive earnings is value relevant.  Earnings in other segments are irrelevant.  These results do 
not deny the prevailed thought that the diversification does not necessarily contribute to the growth of firm 
value.  Operating revenues and expenses, investments, depreciation amount, and asset balances in each 
segment, which are mandated to disclose in Japan, are value relevant.  In this sense, current disclosure 
regulation has a rational basis.  Although the regulation on train fares was revised in the tide of deregulation, 
we cannot find the change in the relation between segment earnings and stock prices.  The change of 
regulatory circumstances does not significantly influence the allocation of earnings over periods.    On the other 
hand, accounting cross subsidization, i.e. the transfer of expenses from non-transportation segment to 
transportation segment, was reduced in second half period under investigation, as compared with the first half 
period.  The change of regulatory circumstances affects the allocation of earnings among segments.  
However, the accounting subsidization (that is, the transfer of expenses) does not decrease the relevance of 
operating profits in segments.  Discretionary allocation does not impair the information value of earnings.
The transfer of expenses form non-transportation segment to transportation segment can increase the operating 
revenues in transportation segment, which is more certain than operating revenues in non-transportation 
segment, through cost principle in rate regulation and the transferred earnings is positively associated with firm 
value. 
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 ͜ͷݚڀ͸ɺమಓձࣾͷηάϝϯτརӹʢࣄۀผརӹʣͷ value relevance Λݕূͨ͠΋ͷͰ͋Δɻ
మಓձࣾͷӡ༌ࣄۀͱෆಈ࢈ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸ɺvalue relevant Ͱ͋ͬͨɻϨδϟʔࣄۀͷଛࣦʹ͸େ
͖ͳϊΠζؚ͕·Ε͍ͯΔ΋ͷͷɺࠇࣈֹ͸ value relevant Ͱ͋ͬͨɻͦΕΒҎ֎ͷࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸
irrelevant Ͱ͋Γɺࣄۀଟ֯Խ͸اۀՁ஋Λඞͣ͠΋ߴΊͳ͍ͱ͍͏௨આ͸ɺ͜ͷݚڀͰ͸൱ఆ͞Εͳ
͔ͬͨɻӦۀऩӹɺӦۀඅ༻ɺ౤ࢿֹɺݮՁঈ٫ֹɺࢿ࢈࢒ߴΛηάϝϯτ͝ͱʹ։ࣔ͢Δ͜ͱ͕ا
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Γɺ ݁߹ࡒͷඅ༻഑෼ʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺ ͋·Γݚڀ͞Ε͍ͯͳ͍ɻ ͜ͷݚڀͰऔΓ্͛Δͷ͸ɺ










ΕΏ͑ʹɺ ࣄۀ۠෼ͷൺֱՄೳੑ͕ߴ͍మಓձࣾΛର৅ʹͯ͠ࣄۀผརӹͷ relevance Λݕ
                                                             
1  ͜ͷ໰୊ʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺେ೔ํ (2004b) Λࢀর͞Ε͍ͨɻ   2
ূ͢Δҙٛ͸େ͖͍Ͱ͋Ζ͏ɻ͜ͷݚڀͷୈ 1 ͷ໨త͸ɺమಓձࣾͷηάϝϯτརӹʢࣄ










ͲͷΑ͏ͳӨڹΛ͋ͨ͑ͨͷ͔Λ͔֬ΊΔɻ෼ੳظؒ͸ 1991 ೥ 3 ݄ظ͔Β 2004 ೥ 3 ݄ظ
·Ͱͷ 14 ೥ؒͰ͋Γɺ෼ੳ্ɺ͜ΕΛલ൒ͷ 7 ೥ؒͱޙ൒ͷ 7 ೥ؒͷ 2 ظʹ෼͚ͯɺརӹ








ෆಈ࢈ࣄۀ͸ऩӹͷೋຊபͰ͋ΓɺͲͪΒͷӦۀརӹ΋ value relevant Ͱ͋ͬͨɻ·ͨɺϨ
δϟʔࣄۀͷଛࣦʹ͸େ͖ͳϊΠζؚ͕·Ε͍ͯΔ΋ͷͷɺ ࠇࣈֹ͸ value relevant Ͱ͋ͬ
ͨɻ͜ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺϨδϟʔࣄۀͷଛࣦ͕શࣾత؍఺Ͱ͸޿ࠂએ఻අͷΑ͏ͳޮՌΛ΋ͭͱ








౓ؒ഑෼ʹ໌֬ͳӨڹΛ͓͋ͨ͑ͯΒͣɺ ӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹͷ relevance ʹ΋ಛผͳӨڹΛ͋
͍ͨ͑ͯͳ͍ɻଞํɺඇӡ༌ࣄۀ͔Βӡ༌ࣄۀʹඅ༻ΛৼΓସ͑Δձܭ্ͷ಺෦ิॿ͸ɺ
લ൒ظʹݦஶͰ͋ͬͨ΋ͷͷɺ ޙ൒ظͰ͸ͦͷֹ͸ॖখͨ͠ɻ ͭ·Γɺ ن੍؀ڥͷมԽ͸ɺ
ηάϝϯτؒͷརӹͷ഑෼ʹ͸ॏཁͳӨڹΛ͍͋ͨ͑ͯΔͷͰ͋Δɻͨͩ͠ɺͦͷৼସૢ
࡞͸ɺ ࣄۀผརӹͷ relevance Λ௿Լ͓ͤͯ͞Βͣɺ ࡋྔʹΑΔ഑෼ૢ࡞͸རӹͷ৘ใՁ஋
ΛଛͶ͍ͯͳ͍ɻඇӡ༌ࣄۀ͔Βӡ༌ࣄۀ΁ͷඅ༻ͷৼସ͸ɺݪՁճऩΛิঈ͢Δྉۚن
੍ʹΑ࣮ͬͯ֬ͳӦۀऩӹʢྉۚऩೖʣΛ૿Ճͤ͞Δͱ༧૝͞ΕΔ͕ɺͦͷৼସֹ͸اۀ
Ձ஋ͱਖ਼ͷؔ܎ʹ͋ͬͨɻͦͷৼସֹ͸ɺvalue relevant Ͱ͋ͬͨɻ 
 ͜ͷ࿦จͷҎԼͷߏ੒͸ɺͭ͗ͷ௨ΓͰ͋Δɻ2 અ͸ɺηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ༗༻ੑͱమಓ








 ͜ͷ࿦จͷݚڀςʔϚ͸ɺطଘͷ 2 ͭͷݚڀྖҬʹؔ࿈͍ͯ͠Δɻ1 ͭ͸ηάϝϯτ৘
ใͷ༗༻ੑͰ͋Γɺ΋͏ 1 ͭ͸ྉۚن੍͕اۀձܭʹ͋ͨ͑ΔӨڹͰ͋Δɻୈ 1 ͷηάϝ
ϯτ৘ใʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺઌߦݚڀͷ஝ੵ͕ଟ͍ɻҰൠʹɺηάϝϯτ͝ͱʹϦεΫͱϦλʔ
ϯ͕ҟͳΔͳΒ͹ɺηάϝϯτผͷձܭ৘ใ͸اۀධՁʹ໾ཱͭ͸ͣͰ͋ΔɻΞϝϦΧͷ






͢Δاۀ΋ଟ͔ͬͨΑ͏Ͱ͋Δɻ ΋ͪΖΜɺ ϦεΫͱϦλʔϯ͕ҟͳΔࣄۀΛ·ͱΊΕ͹ɺ  4
ͦΕ͚ͩηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ༗༻ੑ͸௿Լ͢ΔͰ͋Ζ͏ɻͦ͏ͨ͠։ࣔن੍ͷࠎൈ͖͸ɺ࿈









෦؅ཧͰ࠾༻͍ͯ͠Δηάϝϯτ۠෼Λ֎෦ใࠂʹ΋ద༻͢Δ management approach ͕ձ
ܭ੍౓Ͱ࠾༻͞Εͨ





໘ʹ෼ੳͷ໨͕޲͚ΒΕ͖ͯͨɻࣄۀผηάϝϯτͷ৘ใʹ͍ͭͯɺCollins and Simons 
(1979)  ͸ɺ ࣄۀผηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ։͕ࣔɺ ࢢ৔ϦεΫͷධՁʹӨڹΛ͋ͨ͑ͨ͜ͱ͔Βɺ
ࣄۀผͷηάϝϯτ৘ใ͸༗༻Ͱ͋Δͱใࠂ͍ͯ͠Δɻ·ͨɺBaldwin (1984) ʹΑΔͱɺ
ࣄۀผηάϝϯτ৘ใ͸ΞφϦετͷརӹ༧ଌͷਫ਼౓Λ޲্ͤ͞Δͱ͞ΕɺLobo et al. 
(1998)  ͸ɺࣄۀผηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ։ࣔʹΑͬͯɺגՁͷมಈੑ͕૿େ͠ɺΞφϦετͷ
རӹ༧ଌͷਫ਼౓͕޲্ͨ͜͠ͱ͔Βɺηάϝϯτ৘ใʹ͸௥Ճతͳ৘ใ಺༰͕͋Δͱใࠂ
͍ͯ͠Δɻ͞ΒʹɺSFAS No. 131 ͷઃఆޙͷ೥୅ʹ͍ͭͯ΋ɺBerger and Hann (2003) ͸ɺ
ࣄۀผηάϝϯτͷࡉ෼Խʹͱ΋ͳͬͯΞφϦετͷ༧ଌਫ਼౓͕޲্͢Δͱͱ΋ʹɺSFAS 
No. 131 ʹΑΔηάϝϯτ৘ใ͸ظ଴֎Ϧλʔϯͱ༗ҙͳؔ܎ʹ͋Δͱ͍ͯ͠Δʢͳ͓ɺ
Venkataraman, 2001 ΋ࢀরʣ ɻଞํɺࣄۀผͷηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ༗༻ੑʹ͍ͨͯ͠͸ջٙ࿦
΋͋ΔɻDhaliwal et al. (1983) ͸ɺࣄۀผηάϝϯτ͝ͱͷࢿ࢈࢒ߴͷ৘ใ͸ɺاۀͷࣄ
ۀϦεΫͷධՁʹӨڹΛ͍͋ͨ͑ͯͳ͍ͱࢦఠ͓ͯ͠ΓɺΦʔετϥϦΞاۀΛର৅ͱ͠
                                                             
2  ͜ͷ management approach ΁ͷ൷൑͸ɺHerrmann (1996) Herrmann and Thomas (1997a, b) 
Emmanuel and Garrod (2002) ͳͲΛࢀরɻͳ͓ɺϦΞϧɾΦϓγϣϯཧ࿦ʹΑͬͯηάϝϯτ
৘ใͷ relevance Λݕূͨ͠ Chen and Zhang (2003)  ͸ management approach ʹҰఆͷධՁΛ͋ͨ
͍͑ͯΔɻ   5





ϝϯςʔγϣϯΛࡋྔతʹܾఆ͢Δ͜ͱ͕ɺଟ͘ͷݚڀͰใࠂ͞Ε͍ͯΔʢFeltham et al., 
1992, Gigler et al., 1994, Hayes and Lundholm, 1996, Nagarajan and Sridhar, 1996, Harris, 1998, 
Ettredge et al., 2002, Leuz, 2003ʣ ɻͦͷΑ͏ʹاۀͷηάϝϯςʔγϣϯʹ͹Β͖͕ͭ͋Δ
͜ͱ͸ɺࣄۀผηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ༗༻ੑΛ࣮ূతʹ֬ೝ͢Δ࡞ۀʹͱͬͯେ͖ͳো֐Ͱ͋




஍Ҭผηάϝϯτͷ৘ใʹ͍ͭͯɺ Prodhan (1986)  ͱ Prodhan and Harris (1989)  ͸ɺ஍Ҭ
ผηάϝϯτͷ৘ใ։͕ࣔɺ اۀͷγεςϚςΟοΫ ɾ ϦεΫʹӨڹΛ͋ͨ͑ͨ͜ͱ͔Βɺ
஍Ҭผͷηάϝϯτ৘ใʹ͸৘ใ಺༰͕͋Δͱใࠂ͍ͯ͠Δɻ·ͨɺBalakrishnan et al. 
(1990)  ͱ Ahadiat (1993)  ͸ɺ஍Ҭผηάϝϯτͷ৘ใ͸ɺ࣌ܥྻϞσϧʹΑΔརӹ༧ଌͷ
ਫ਼౓Λ޲্ͤ͞Δ͜ͱΛ͖͋Β͔ʹͨ͠ɻಉ༷ʹɺNichols et al. (1995)  ͸ɺ஍Ҭผηάϝ
ϯτ৘ใ͸ΞφϦετͷརӹ༧ଌਫ਼౓Λ޲্ͤ͞Δͱใࠂ͍ͯ͠ΔɻStreet et al. (2000)  ͱ 
Doupnik abd Seese (2001)  ͸ɺSFAS No. 131  ͷઃఆʹͱ΋ͳͬͯɺ։ࣔηάϝϯτ਺͓Αͼ
։߲ࣔ໨਺͕૿Ճͨ͜͠ͱΛࣔ͠ɺձܭج४ͷվగ͕ηάϝϯτ৘ใΛվળͨ͜͠ͱΛࣔ
͍ࠦͯ͠Δɻ͞ΒʹɺBehn et al. (2002)  ͸ɺSFAS No. 14 ͔Β No. 131 ΁ͷҠߦʹΑͬͯɺ
։ࣔ͞ΕΔ஍Ҭผηάϝϯτ͕ΑΓࡉ෼Խ͞Εɺച্ߴ༧ଌͷਫ਼౓͸ߴ·ͬͨͱࢦఠͯ͠
͍Δɻ 
ձܭ৘ใͷ value relevance ͕ݚڀऀͷ஫໨ΛूΊΔͳ͔Ͱɺ஍Ҭผηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ








࠷ۙͰ͸ɺ ͦͷΑ͏ͳ relevance ͷنఆཁҼʹ໨͕޲͚ΒΕ͓ͯΓɺ Bodnar et al. (2003)  ͸
ΦʔετϥϦΞɺΧφμɺΠΪϦεͷاۀΛର৅ͱͯ͠ɺϦλʔϯΛརӹͷมԽֹʹճؼ
ͨ͠ɻ൴Β͸ɺภճؼ܎਺͸ւ֎ͷརӹͷ΄͏͕ࠃ಺ͷརӹΑΓ΋େ͖͍͜ͱΛݕূ͠ɺ
ͦͷཧ༝Λࣄۀͷ੒௕ػձͷ૬ҧʹ΋ͱΊ͍ͯΔɻ Callen et al. (2004)  ͸ɺ ւ֎ͷརӹʹͨ
͍͢Δ౤ࢿՈͷධՁ͸ࠃ಺ͷརӹΑΓ΋௿͍͜ͱΛࢦఠ͠ɺւ֎ͷརӹʹର͢ΔධՁͷߴ
௿͸ɺػؔ౤ࢿՈͷॴ༗ൺ཰ͷେখɺ͓Αͼגओͷอ༗ظؒͷ௕୹ͱਖ਼ͷؔ܎ʹ͋Δͱड़
΂͍ͯΔɻ·ͨɺHope et al. (2004)  ͸ɺظ଴֎ϦλʔϯΛརӹͷมԽֹʹճؼͨ͠ͱ͖ɺ
ࠃ಺ͷརӹʹൺ΂ͯɺւ֎ͷརӹʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͸খ͍͜͞ͱΛݕূͨ͠ɻ൴Β͸ɺւ֎ͷ
རӹʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͕ɺ (1)ηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ։ࣔΛنఆͨ͠ SFAS No. 131 ͷಋೖɺ (2)։ࣔ͞








ͱ͍ΘΕ͍ͯΔʢLand and Stulz, 1994, Brger and Ofek, 1995, Servaes, 1996, Lins and Servaes, 
1999, Denis et al., 2002, Lamont and Polk, 2002, Borghesi et al., 2003, Fleming et al., 2003, 
Fauver et al., 2004, Gomes and Livdan, 2004,ʣ ɻ͜ͷଟ֯ԽσΟεΧ΢ϯτ͕ੜ͡ΔݪҼʹͭ
͍ͯ͸ɺଟ֯Խ͕৘ใͷඇରশੑΛେ͖͘͢ΔʢDunn and Nathan, 1998, Givoly et al., 1999, 
Erwin and Perry, 2000ʣͱ͍͏ݟղ͕༗ྗͰ͋ΔɻBens and Monahan (2004)  ͸ɺࣗൃత։ࣔ
ͳͲʹΑΔ৘ใͱଟ֯ԽʹΑΔ௒աՁ஋ʢexcess valueʣͱ͕ਖ਼ͷؔ܎ʹ͋Δͱใࠂ͍ͯ͠
ΔʢConovor and Wallace, 1995 ΋ಉ༷ʣ ɻͨͩ͠ɺ࠷ۙͰ͸ɺඇରশੑ࿦΍ଟ֯ԽσΟεΧ
΢ϯτͷݱ৅ͦͷ΋ͷΛ൱ఆ͢Δݚڀ΋͋ΔʢGuo et al., 2001, Hadlock et al., 2001, Campa 
and Kedia, 2002, Thomas, 2002, Best et al., 2004, Villalonga, 2004a, bʣ ɻ 
 ͜ͷଟ֯ԽσΟεΧ΢ϯτͷ໰୊͕͋ΔͨΊɺ͔Γʹηάϝϯτ৘ใ͕ value relevant  7
Ͱ͸ͳ͔ͬͨͱ͖ɺͦΕ͕ձܭج४΍ձܭ৘ใͷଆͷཁҼʹΑΔͷ͔ɺͦΕͱ΋ɺاۀͷ
ηάϝϯτ׆ಈͷଆͷཁҼʹΑΔͷ͔͸ɺ؆୯ʹ͸Θ͔Βͳ͍ɻ͢Ͱʹड़΂ͨ௨Γɺࣄۀ
ผηάϝϯτͷརӹ৘ใͷ relevance ʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺ ݕ౼͕ਚ͘͞Εͳ͍··์ஔ͞Ε͍ͯΔɻ





ϝϯτ৘ใͷ։ࣔن੍ʹ͸߹ཧੑ͕ͳ͍ͷ͔ɺ ͜ͷݚڀ͕ηάϝϯτརӹͷ relevance Λݕ
ূ͢Δҙٛ͸େ͖͍ɻ 




















                                                             
3  ਌ձࣾݸผͷརӹΛର৅ͱͨ͠෼ੳ͸ɺେ೔ํ (2004a) Λࢀর͞Ε͍ͨɻ   8
Ε͖ͯͨ




ʢHarris, 1993, Klassen et al., 1993, Jacob, 1996, Collins et al., 1998, Klassen and Shackelford, 
1998, Petroni and Shackelford, 1999, Beatty and Harris, 2001, Yetman, 2001, Gramlich et al., 
2004, Jeffrey et al., 2004, αʔϕΠ͸ Schakelford and Shevlin, 2001 Λࢀরʣ ɻ·ͨɺྉۚن
੍ࣄۀͱඇن੍ࣄۀͱͷ͍͋ͩͷඅ༻ͷৼସʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺපӃۀʢBlanchard et al., 1986, 
Noreen and Soderstrom, 1994, Eldenburg and Kallapur, 1997, 2000ʣ ɺ๷Ӵ࢈ۀʢDemski and 
Magee, 1992, Litchtenberg, 1992, Rogerson, 1992, 1994, Thomas and Tung, 1992, McGowan and 
Vendrzyk, 2002ʣ ɺۜߦۀʢCavalluzzo, 1998ʣͳͲΛର৅ʹݚڀ͕ͳ͞Ε͍ͯΔɻ 
͜ͷݚڀͰ͸ɺమಓྉۚن੍ʹண໨ͯ͠ɺӡ༌ࣄۀͱඇӡ༌ࣄۀͱͷ͍͋ͩͷඅ༻ͷৼ
ସ ʢձܭ্ͷ಺෦ิॿʣ ͷ༗ແͱɺ ن੍؀ڥͷมԽ͕ͦͷৼସʹ͋ͨ͑ͨӨڹΛݕূ͢Δɻ
ྉۚҾ্͖͛ʢҾ͖Լ͛ճආʣͷΠϯηϯςΟϒͱརӹͷৼସͱͷؔ܎͸ɺ͜Ε·Ͱ΄ͱ
ΜͲݕূ͞Ε͓ͯΒͣɺ͜ͷ࿦จͷಠ૑తͳண؟఺Ͱ͋Δɻ͞ΒʹɺͦΕΒͷ഑෼ύλʔ
ϯͷมԽ͕ɺ మಓΛ֩ͱ͢Δӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹͷ relevance ʹӨڹΛ͋ͨ͑ͨͷ͔൱͔Λ͔֬
ΊΔɻ ഑෼ύλʔϯΛΊ͙Δయܕతͳձܭ໰୊Λɺ རӹͷ relevance ͷݕূʹू໿͢Δ఺͕ɺ
ಛච͢΂͖ಛ௃Ͱ͋Δɻ 
 
̏ ηάϝϯτརӹͷ Value Relevance 
 ͜ͷݚڀͰ͸ɺమಓձࣾ 27 ࣾʢ348 اۀʕ೥ʣͷ࿈݁ࡒ຿ॾදʹ։ࣔ͞Ε͍ͯΔηάϝ
ϯτ৘ใͷ value relevance Λݕূ͢Δɻαϯϓϧͷձܭ਺஋͸ɺ͢΂ͯ༗Ձূ݊ใࠂॻ͔






ݚڀ͕෼ੳର৅ͱ͢Δظؒ͸ɺ ηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ։͕ࣔ։࢝͞Εͨ 1991 ೥ 3 ݄ظ͔Β 2004
                                                             
4  ͜ͷ໰୊ʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺେ೔ํ (2003,  2004b) Λࢀর͞Ε͍ͨɻ   9









͜ͷ࿦จͰ͸ɺ మಓɺ όεɺ λΫγʔͳͲͷӡ༌ ʢTRANʣ ɺ ෆಈ࢈ͷ௞ିٴͼ෼ৡ ʢRESTʣ ɺ
༡Ԃ஍ɾҿ৯ۀͳͲͷϨδϟʔʢLSURʣ ɺӺചళ΍ඦ՟ళʹ͓͚ΔখചʢRTALʣ ɺݐઃ








 ֤ηάϝϯτͷגՁͱ 1 ג͋ͨΓͷӦۀརӹʢਖ਼֬ʹ͸ɺ഑ොෆೳӦۀඅ༻߇আલӦۀ
རӹʣʹ͍ͭͯهड़౷ܭྔΛ·ͱΊͨͷ͕ɺTable 1 ͷ A1ɺA2ɺA3 Ͱ͋ΔɻA1 ͸ 1991 ೥
3 ݄ظ͔Β 2004 ೥ 3 ݄ظ·ͰͷαϯϓϧظؒશମɺA2 ͸ 1991 ೥ 3 ݄ظ͔Β 1997 ೥ 3 ݄
ظ·Ͱͷલ൒ظɺ A3͸ 1998೥ 3 ݄ظ͔Β2004೥ 3 ݄ظ·Ͱͷޙ൒ظͷهड़౷ܭྔͰ͋Δɻ
P ͸גՁɺOP ͸શࣾϕʔεʢ࿈্݁ʣͷӦۀརӹɺTRAN ҎԼ͸લड़ͷ֤ࣄۀ۠෼ͷӦۀ
རӹͰ͋Δ
5ɻ෼ੳظؒͷத్Ͱେܕͷ JR ג͕৽ن্৔͞Ε͍ͯΔͨΊɺ1 ג͋ͨΓͷม
਺͸෼෍্͕ํʹ࿪ΜͰ͍Δɻͦ͜Ͱɺ͜͜Ͱ͸ϝσΟΞϯʹ஫໨͠Α͏ɻ௕ظʹΘͨΔ
ܠؾ௿໎ͷӨڹΛड͚ͯɺͦͷଞ MISC Λআ͍ͯɺ͓͠ͳ΂ͯརӹਫ४͸ޙ൒ظͷ΄͏͕
௿͘ͳ͍ͬͯΔɻࣄۀ۠෼ผʹݟΔͱɺӡ༌ࣄۀ TRAN ͱෆಈ࢈ࣄۀ REST ͷརӹਫ४͸
΄΅ಉ͡Ͱ͋ΔɻJR Λআ͍ͨࢲమͰ͸ɺӡ༌ࣄۀͱෆಈ࢈ࣄۀ͕ऩӹͷೋຊபʹͳ͍ͬͯ
                                                             
5  ֤ࣄۀ۠෼ͷӦۀརӹͷ߹ܭ͔Β಺෦औҾ෼Λௐ੔͠ɺ͞Βʹɺ഑ොෆೳӦۀඅ༻Λ߇আ͠











Δɻ ͨͩ͠ɺ ޙ൒ظʹ͸஍ՁԼམͷӨڹΛड͚ͨͨΊͰ͋Ζ͏͔ɺ རӹ཰͸େ͖͘௿Լ͠ɺ
ͦͷ͜ͱ͕మಓ֤ࣾͷӦۀརӹΛԡ͠Լ͍͛ͯΔɻ 
 ͭ͗ʹɺ͜ΕΒͷηάϝϯτརӹͷ value relevance Λݕূ͠Α͏ɻརӹࢿຊԽϞσϧʹ
ΑΔճؼࣜ͸ͭ͗ͷ௨ΓͰ͋Δɻ 
 
 it it it it it RTAL LSUR REST TRAN P 4 3 2 1 β β β β α + + + + =  
it y y it it u D MISC CONS   6 5 ∑ + + + + β β β  (1) 
 
P  ʹ  ܾࢉ೔ʢ3 ݄຤೔ʣ࣌఺ͷגՁ 
TRAN  ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹ 
REST  ʹ  ෆಈ࢈ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹ 
LSUR  ʹ  Ϩδϟʔࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹ 
RTAL  ʹ  খചࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹ 
CONS  ʹ  ݐઃࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹ 
MISC  ʹ  ͦͷଞͷࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹ 












 Table3 ͸ɺճؼࣜ(1)ʹΑΔ෼ੳ݁ՌΛ·ͱΊͨ΋ͷͰ͋Δɻ֤ηϧͷ 3 ஈͷ਺஋͸ɺ্
͔Βɺภճؼ܎਺ɺWhite ͷ t ஋ɺ༗ҙ֬཰Ͱ͋ΔʢҎԼɺಉ༷ʣ ɻఆ਺߲ͱ೥౓μϛʔʹ




൒ظʢ1991 ೥ 3 ݄ظʵ1997 ೥ 3 ݄ظʣΑΓ΋ɺޙ൒ظʢ1998 ೥ 3 ݄ظʵ2004 ೥ 3 ݄ظʣ
ͷ΄͏͕རӹͷ relevance ͸ߴ͍ͱਪଌͰ͖Δɻ ͢΂ͯͷࣄۀ۠෼ͷӦۀརӹΛઆ໌ม਺ͱ
ͨ͠ Panel B ͷ(8)ͷ݁Ռͱ Panel C ͷ(8)ͷ݁ՌͱΛൺֱ͢ΔͱɺલऀͰ͸͍ͣΕͷࣄۀ۠
෼ͷརӹ΋༗ҙͰ͸ͳ͘ɺޙऀͰ͸ɺӡ༌ࣄۀ TRANS ͱෆಈ࢈ࣄۀ REST ͷӦۀརӹ͕
গͳ͘ͱ΋ 5%ਫ४Ͱ༗ҙʹͳ͍ͬͯΔɻ ظؒผʹൺֱ͢Δͱɺ ηάϝϯτརӹ৘ใͷ value 
relevance ͸લ൒ظΑΓ΋ޙ൒ظͷ΄͏͕ߴ͍ɻ 
 ηάϝϯτؒͷ૬ҧΛ͔֬ΊͯΈΔͱɺPanel A ͷ(8)ʹ͓͍ͯ͸ɺӡ༌ɺෆಈ࢈ɺͦͷ
ଞͷࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸༗ҙʹͳ͍ͬͯΔɻϨδϟʔɺখചɺݐઃͷ 3 ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸༗
ҙͰ͸ͳ͍ɻ ͜Εͱಉ༷ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺ Panel C ͷ(8)Ͱ΋֬ೝͰ͖Δɻ ӡ༌ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸ɺ
ྉۚن੍ʹΑͬͯ҆ఆ͍ͯ͠ΔͨΊ͔ɺ Panel Bͱ Panel CΛ௨ͯ͡Ұ؏ͯ͠༗ҙͰ͋Δ ʢ(2)





Α͏ͳ relevance ͷ૬ҧ͸ɺ ෆಈ࢈ࣄۀʹ͍ͨ͢Δࢢ৔ͷධՁɺ ͋Δ͍͸কདྷऩӹʹ͍ͨ͢
Δظ଴͕มԽͨ͜͠ͱʹΑΔͱߟ͑ͯΑ͍Ͱ͋Ζ͏ɻͳ͓ɺPanel A ͓Αͼ Panel C ʹ͓͍
ͯɺӡ༌ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹʹ͔͔Δ܎਺ͱෆಈ࢈ࣄۀͷͦΕͱͷ͍͋ͩʹ౷ܭతʹ༗ҙͳࠩ
ҟ͸ͳ͘ɺ྆ऀ͸ࢢ৔Ͱಉ͡Α͏ʹධՁ͞Ε͍ͯΔͱਪଌͰ͖Δɻ 
 هड़౷ܭྔΛ௨͔ͯ֬͡ΊͨΑ͏ʹɺమಓձࣾͷϨδϟʔࣄۀͷۀ੷͸ۃ୺ʹѱ͘ɺ੺  12
ࣈͷαϯϓϧͷ਺΋ଟ͔ͬͨɻͦ͜ͰɺଛࣦαϯϓϧΛίϯτϩʔϧͯ͠ɺࠇࣈͱ੺ࣈʹ
෼͚ͯརӹͷ value relevance Λݕূͯ͠ΈΔɻ 
 
it L it it it L it it LSUR D LSUR REST TRAN D TRAN P 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 β β β β β α ′ + + + ′ + + =  
it L it it L it CONS D CONS RTAL D RTAL 4 5 5 3 4 4 β β β β ′ + + ′ + +  
it y y it L it u D MISC D MISC + + ′ + + ∑β β β 5 6 6  (2) 
 
্هͷ(2)ࣜͷ DLjʢjʹ1, 2, 3, 4, 5ʣ͸ɺ֤ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͕ϚΠφεͷ৔߹Λ 1ɺͦΕҎ
֎Λ 0 ͱ͢Δμϛʔม਺Ͱ͋ΔɻͦΕҎ֎ͷม਺͸(1)ࣜͱಉ͡Ͱ͋ΓɺσϑϨʔλʔ΋ಉ
͡Ͱ͋Δɻෆಈ࢈ࣄۀ REST ͸ɺ੺ࣈͷαϯϓϧ͕ 1 ͭͰ͋ͬͨͨΊɺͦͷμϛʔΛ෇͚
͍ͯͳ͍ɻ(2)ࣜΛ෼ੳର৅ظؒશମɺલ൒ظɺޙ൒ظͦΕͧΕͰਪఆͨ݁͠Ռ͕ɺTable 4
Ͱ͋Δɻӡ༌ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸ɺࠇࣈͰ΋੺ࣈͰ΋ɺࢿຊԽ܎਺ʢภճؼ܎਺ʣʹ༗ҙͳ
ࠩҟ͸ͳ͍ɻ͜Ε͸ɺಉࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͕ permanent Ͱ͋Δ͜ͱΛ͍ࣔͯ͠Δɻ 
ଞํɺϨδϟʔࣄۀͷ৔߹͸ɺظؒશମʹ͍ͭͯͷ݁ՌʹΑΔͱɺଛࣦ͸ transitory Ͱ͋














 ͞Βʹɺখചࣄۀɺݐઃࣄۀɺͦͷଞͷࣄۀͷ 3 ηάϝϯτʹ͍ͭͯɺӦۀརӹͷ୯७
߹ܭΛ୯Ұͷม਺ͱͯ͠ɺͦΕͱӡ༌ࣄۀ͓Αͼෆಈ࢈ࣄۀͷརӹͷ 3 ۠෼ͷརӹʹΑΔ  13
ଟॏճؼ෼ੳΛͯ͠Έͨʢ݁Ռ͸දʹ͍ͯ͠ͳ͍ʣ ɻ͜Ε͸ɺηάϝϯτΛࡉ෼Խ͢Ε͹͢
Δ΄Ͳརӹ৘ใͷ༗༻ੑ͕ߴ·Δͷ͔Λ͔֬ΊΔͨΊͰ͋Δɻใࠂηάϝϯτ͕ա৒෼ׂ
͞Ε͍ͯΔͷͰ͋Ε͹ɺ Ή͠Ζෳ਺ͷηάϝϯτΛଋͶͨ΄͏͕རӹ৘ใͷ relevance ͸ߴ
·ΔͰ͋Ζ͏ɻ3 ηάϝϯτΛଋͶͨ৔߹ɺࣗ༝౓मਖ਼ࡁܾఆ܎਺͸͘͝ۇ͔ͳ͕Β্ঢ
͠ɺͦͷ্ঢ෯͸ɺશମظؒͰ 0.14%ɺલ൒ظͰ 0.59%ɺޙ൒ظͰ͸ 0.14%Ͱ͋ͬͨɻଛࣦ
μϛʔΛೖΕͨ৔߹ͷ্ঢ෯͸ɺͦΕͧΕɺ0.51%ɺ1.34%ɺ0.76%Ͱ͋ͬͨɻ͜ΕΒͷ݁




















ʹఆઆʹͳ͍ͬͯΔʢThomas, 1969, 1974ʣ ɻ 
 ͦ͜Ͱɺ ֤ηάϝϯτͷച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖ͕ value relevant Ͱ͋Δ͔൱͔Λݕূ͢Δ
ͨΊɺҎԼͷճؼࣜΛਪఆͨ͠ɻͳ͓ɺ͜͜Ͱ΋ɺෆۉҰ෼ࢄͷӨڹΛ؇࿨͢ΔͨΊɺఆ
਺߲ͱ೥౓μϛʔΛআ͘આ໌ม਺͸ɺલظ຤גՁͰσϑϨʔτͨ͠ɻ   14
 
 it it it it it RTAL S LSUR S REST S TRAN S P _ _ _ _ 4 3 2 1 β β β β α + + + + =  
it y y it it u D MISC S CONS S + + + + ∑β β β _ _ 6 5  (3) 
 
P  ʹ  ܾࢉ೔ʢ3 ݄຤೔ʣ࣌఺ͷגՁ 
S_TRAN ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖ 
S_REST  ʹ  ෆಈ࢈ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖ 
S_LSUR  ʹ  Ϩδϟʔࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖ 
S_RTAL  ʹ  খചࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖ 
S_CONS ʹ  ݐઃࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖ 
S_MISC  ʹ  ͦͷଞͷࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖ 
Dy  ʹ  ೥౓μϛʔ 
 















 Table 8 ͸ɺ ֤ϞσϧʹΑΔגՁઆ໌ྗͷ͕ࠩ౷ܭతʹ༗ҙͰ͋Δ͔൱͔Λɺ Vuong (1989)
ʹΑΔݕఆʹΑͬͯݕূͨ݁͠ՌͰ͋ΔɻModel 1 ͸શࣾϕʔεʢ࿈্݁ʣͷӦۀརӹʹ
ΑΔϞσϧɺ Model 2 ͸֤ηάϝϯτͷച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖʹΑΔϞσϧ ʢ(3)ࣜʣ ɺ Model 
3 ͸֤ηάϝϯτͷӦۀརӹʹΑΔϞσϧʢ(1)ࣜʣ ɺModel 4 ͸֤ηάϝϯτͷӦۀརӹʹ
ଛࣦμϛʔΛՃ͑ͨϞσϧʢ(2)ࣜʣΛද͍ͯ͠Δɻͳ͓ɺ͢΂ͯͷϞσϧ͸೥౓μϛʔΛ  15
ؚΜͰ͍Δɻલ൒ظʹ͓͍ͯ͸ Model 1 ͷ΄͏͕ Model 2 ΑΓ΋આ໌ྗ͸ߴ͘ɺޙ൒ظͰ
͸ͦΕ͕ٯస͍ͯ͠Δ͕ɺ ྆ऀͷࠩ͸༗ҙͰ͸ͳ͍ɻ ֤ηάϝϯτͷརӹʹ෼ղͨ͠ Model 
3 ͷઆ໌ྗ͸ɺͦΕΒΛ౷߹ͨ͠ Model 1 ͷઆ໌ྗΑΓ΋͓͠ͳ΂ͯߴ͍͕ɺͦͷࠩ͸౷
ܭతʹ༗ҙͰ͸ͳ͍ɻ֤ηάϝϯτͷརӹΛࠇࣈͱ੺ࣈʹ෼͚ͨ Model 4 ͸ɺશࣾϕʔε
ͷӦۀརӹʹΑΔ Model 1 ΑΓ΋આ໌ྗ͸ߴ͍ɻͨͩ͠ɺͦͷ͕ࠩ౷ܭతʹ༗ҙͰ͋Δͷ

























                                                             
6  ΋ͪΖΜɺརӹ৘ใͷՁ஋ΛߴΊΔ͏͑ͰɺӦۀඅ༻ͷݱࡏͷܭࢉํ๏͕࠷దͰ͋Δͷ͔൱
͔͸Θ͔Βͳ͍ɻ   16
Ϟσϧ͸ɺݱࡏͷͱ͜Ζɺଘࡏ͍ͯ͠ͳ͍ɻͦ͜Ͱɺ͜ͷݚڀͰ͸ɺརӹࢿຊԽϞσϧʹ
ϚʔδϯͷେখΛද͢μϛʔม਺Λಋೖ͢Δ͜ͱʹΑΓɺ Ϛʔδϯ৘ใͷ relevance Λݕূ
͢ΔɻͦΕʹ͋ͨͬͯ࢖༻ͨ͠ճؼࣜ͸ɺͭ͗ͷ௨ΓͰ͋Δɻ 
 
it MG it it MG it it it LSUR D LSUR REST D REST TRAN P 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 β β β β β α ′ + + ′ + + + =  
it MG it it MG it CONS D CONS RTAL D RTAL 4 5 5 3 4 4 β β β β ′ + + ′ + +  








 Table 9 ͸ɺ(4)ࣜʹΑΔճؼਪఆͷ݁ՌΛ·ͱΊͨ΋ͷͰ͋ΔɻϚʔδϯͷ৘ใ͕ value 
relevant Ͱ͋ΔͱਪఆͰ͖Δͷ͸ɺϨδϟʔࣄۀͰ͋ΔɻϨδϟʔࣄۀͰ͸ɺߴ͍Ϛʔδ
ϯΛ֫ಘ͍ͯ͠ΔαϯϓϧͷӦۀརӹ͸ value relevant Ͱ͋Γɺ ௿͍Ϛʔδϯͷ৔߹ͷͦΕ
͸ irrelevant Ͱ͋ΔɻͦΕ͸ɺશମظؒʢA1ʣ ɺલ൒ظʢB1ʣ ɺޙ൒ظʢC1ʣͷ͢΂ͯʹΘ
ͨͬͯڞ௨Ͱ͋Δɻ͔͠͠ɺϨδϟʔࣄۀͰ͸ɺ੺ࣈΛܭ্͍ͯ͠Δαϯϓϧ͕ଟ͘ɺଛ
ࣦ͸ transitory Ͱ͋ͬͨɻͦΕΏ͑ʹɺA1ɺB1ɺC1 ʹ͓͍ͯϚʔδϯͷμϛʔͱརӹͱͷ
ੵʹ͔͔Δ܎਺ 3 β′͸্ํόΠΞε͕͔͔͍ͬͯΔɻଛࣦʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͕ෛͰ͋ΔͨΊʹɺ
ͦΕ͚ͩ 3 β ͕Լํʹ࿪ΊΒΕ͍ͯΔ͔ΒͰ͋Δɻ 
ͦ͜ͰɺϨδϟʔࣄۀʹ͚ͩɺ(2)ࣜͱಉ͡ଛࣦμϛʔΛ௥ՃతʹೖΕͯΈͨɻͦͷ݁Ռ
͕ɺTable 9 ͷ A2ɺB2ɺC2 Ͱ͋Δɻ͜ͷ݁ՌʹΑΔͱɺલ൒ظͱޙ൒ظͰ͸ɺଛࣦμϛʔ
Λಋೖ͢ΔͱɺϚʔδϯͷμϛʔʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͸༗ҙͰͳ͘ͳͬͯ͠·͏ɻ͔͠͠ɺશମ









 1996 ೥ 3 ݄ظΑΓɺӦۀऩӹɺӦۀඅ༻ʹՃ͑ͯɺظதͷ֤ηάϝϯτ΁ͷ౤ࢿֹɺݮ
Ձঈ٫ֹɺ͓Αͼظ຤࣌఺ͷࢿ࢈ֹʹ͍ͭͯ΋ηάϝϯτผʹ։ࣔ͞ΕΔ͜ͱʹͳͬͨɻ





it RA it it RA it it it LSUR D LSUR REST D REST TRAN P 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 β β β β β α ′ + + ′ + + + =  
it RA it it RA it CONS D CONS RTAL D RTAL 4 5 5 3 4 4 β β β β ′ + + ′ + +  











 Table 10 ͸ɺ(5)ࣜʹΑΔਪఆ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻαϯϓϧ͸ɺ1996 ೥ 3 ݄ظ͔Β 2004 ೥ 3 ݄
ظ·Ͱͷ 233 ࣾʵ೥Ͱ͋ΔɻTable 10 ͷ A ͸ɺࢿ࢈རӹ཰ͷμϛʔΛೖΕͳ͍৔߹ͷਪఆ
݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ͜͜Ͱͷαϒɾαϯϓϧʹ͓͍ͯ΋ɺӡ༌ɺෆಈ࢈ɺͦͷଞͷ 3 ࣄۀͷӦۀ
རӹ͸ value relevant Ͱ͋ΓɺϨδϟʔɺখചɺݐઃͷ 3 ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸ irrelevant Ͱ͋
ΔɻTable 10 ͷ B ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺࢿ࢈རӹ཰ͷμϛʔΛೖΕͨ৔߹ͷਪఆ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻӡ༌͓
Αͼෆಈ࢈ͷӦۀརӹͷ relevance ͸ɺ ࢿ࢈རӹ཰ͷμϛʔͷӨڹΛड͚͍ͯͳ͍͕ɺ ͦͷ  18





ʔࣄۀʹ͸ଛࣦμϛʔΛ͞Βʹಋೖͯ͠ɺ ͦͷόΠΞεΛڲਖ਼ͨ͠ɻ ͦͷਪఆ݁Ռ͕ Table 
10 ͷ C Ͱ͋Δɻ ࢿ࢈རӹ཰μϛʔͱརӹͱͷੵʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͸ਖ਼ɺ ଛࣦμϛʔͱརӹͱͷ
ੵʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͸ෛͰ͋Δ΋ͷͷɺ͍ͣΕ΋౷ܭతʹ༗ҙͰ͸ͳ͍ɻ΍͸Γ Table 10 ͷ B
ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺଛࣦαϯϓϧʹΑΔόΠΞεؚ͕·Ε͓ͯΓɺϨδϟʔࣄۀͷࢿ࢈རӹ཰͕ߴ
͍αϯϓϧͷརӹ͸ relevant Ͱ͋Δͱ͍͏݁Ռ͸ؤڧͰ͸ͳ͍ɻ݁ہɺࢿ࢈རӹ཰ͷ৘ใ









it AG it it AG it it it LSUR D LSUR REST D REST TRAN P 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 β β β β β α ′ + + ′ + + + =  
it AG it it AG it CONS D CONS RTAL D RTAL 4 5 5 3 4 4 β β β β ′ + + ′ + +  
it y y it AG it u D MISC D MISC + + ′ + + ∑β β β 5 6 6  (6) 
 
 ্هͷ DAG ͸ɺࢿ࢈੒௕཰ͷμϛʔͰ͋Γɺ֤ηάϝϯτͷࢿ࢈੒௕཰͕ӡ༌ࣄۀͷࢿ




 Table 10 ͷ D ͸ɺ(6)ࣜʹΑΔਪఆ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻࢿ࢈੒௕཰ͱརӹͱͷੵʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͕


















෼ʣ ɺ͞ΒʹͲͷΑ͏ʹݮՁঈ٫͢Δͷ͔ʢظؒ഑෼ʣͱ͍͏ 2 छྨͷ഑෼ΛΊ͙Γɺࡋྔ
͕ಇ͘ɻࡋྔʹΑͬͯنఆ͞ΕΔඅ༻Λಠཱʹ։ࣔ͢Δͷ͸ɺاۀܦӦऀͷዞҙੑΛ཈ࢭ
͢Δ͜ͱ΍ɺ౤ࢿՈ͕ඞཁͳमਖ਼ΛͰ͖ΔΑ͏ʹ͢ΔͨΊͰ͋Ζ͏ɻ 
 ͦͷΑ͏ͳظ଴͞Εͨ໨త͕࣮ࡍʹୡ੒͞Ε͍ͯΔͷ͔ΛɺݮՁঈ٫৘ใͷ value 
relevance ͷݕূΛ௨ͯ͡ɺؒ઀తʹ͔֬ΊͯΈΑ͏ɻ͜͜Ͱ͸ɺӦۀརӹʹݮՁঈ٫අΛ
໭͠ೖΕֹͨʢঈ٫අ߇আલརӹʣͷ relevance ΛҎԼͷճؼࣜʹΑͬͯݕূ͢Δɻ 
 
 it it it it it DP RTAL DP LSUR DP REST DP TRAN P _ _ _ _ 4 3 2 1 β β β β α + + + + =  
it y y it it u D DP MISC DP CONS + + + + ∑β β β _ _ 6 5  (7) 
 
P  ʹ  ܾࢉ೔ʢ3 ݄຤೔ʣ࣌఺ͷגՁ 
TRAN_DP  ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓঈ٫අ߇আલརӹ 
REST_DP  ʹ  ෆಈ࢈ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓঈ٫අ߇আલརӹ 
LSUR_DP  ʹ  Ϩδϟʔࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓঈ٫අ߇আલརӹ 
RTAL_DP  ʹ  খചࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓঈ٫අ߇আલརӹ 
CONS_DP  ʹ  ݐઃࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓঈ٫අ߇আલརӹ   20
MISC_DP  ʹ  ͦͷଞͷࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓঈ٫අ߇আલརӹ 
Dy  ʹ  ೥౓μϛʔ 
 
 ෆۉҰ෼ࢄͷӨڹΛ؇࿨͢ΔͨΊɺ͜͜Ͱ΋೥౓μϛʔͱఆ਺߲Ҏ֎ͷઆ໌ม਺ͱඃઆ
໌ม਺͸ɺલظ຤גՁͰσϑϨʔτͨ͠ɻαϯϓϧ͸ɺ1996 ೥ 3 ݄ظ͔Β 2004 ೥ 3 ݄ظ
·Ͱͷ 233 ࣾʵ೥Ͱ͋Δɻ σϑϨʔτޙͷઆ໌ม਺ؒͷ૬ؔؔ܎Λ·ͱΊͨͷ͕ɺ Table 11
Ͱ͋ΔɻࠨԼ͸ Pearson ͷੵ཰૬ؔ܎਺ɺӈ্͸ Spearman ͷॱҐ૬ؔ܎਺Ͱ͋ΓɺΧοί
಺ͷ਺஋͸ແ૬ؔͰ͋Δͱ͍͏Ծઆʹ͍ͨ͢Δ༗ҙ֬཰Ͱ͋Δɻ(7)ࣜʹΑΔਪఆ݁Ռ͸ɺ
Table 12 ͷӈ୺ͷྻʹهࡌͨ͠ɻঈ٫લརӹͷ৘ใ͸ɺӡ༌ͱϨδϟʔͷ 2 ࣄۀͰ value 
relevant Ͱ͋Δɻ 
 Table 12 ͷதԝͷྻ͸ɺӦۀརӹΛઆ໌ม਺ͱͨ͠ͱ͖ͷճؼͷ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ͜ͷ݁Ռ
ͱӈ୺ͷྻͷ݁ՌΛൺ΂Δͱɺෆಈ࢈ͱͦͷଞͷࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸ relevant Ͱ͋ΔҰํɺ
ݮՁঈ٫Λ໭͠ೖΕͨม਺͸ relevant Ͱ͸ͳ͘ͳ͍ͬͯΔɻͦΕʹ͍ͨͯ͠ɺϨδϟʔࣄ





relevance ͕ͲͷΑ͏ʹͳΔͷ͔ɺ͜ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺকདྷͷڵຯਂ͍ݕ౼՝୊Λఏڙ͍ͯ͠Δɻ  
 Table 12 ͷࠨ୺ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺച্ߴ͓ΑͼӦۀऩೖΛઆ໌ม਺ͱͨ͠ͱ͖ͷਪఆ݁ՌͰ͋










ετෛ୲Λڧ͍͍ͯΔΘ͚Ͱ͸ͳ͍ɻ   21
 ͜ͷઅͰ͸ɺརӹࢿຊԽϞσϧΛجຊͱͯ͠ɺμϛʔม਺Λར༻͢Δ͜ͱͳͲʹΑΓɺ












ͷ value relevance Λݕূͨ͠ɻਪఆʹར༻ͨ͠ճؼࣜ͸ͭ͗ͷ௨ΓͰ͋Δɻ 
 
 it y y it it it u D NTRAN TRAN P + + + + = ∑β ∆ β ∆ β α ∆ 2 1  (8) 
 
˚P  ʹ  ܾࢉ೔ʢ3 ݄຤೔ʣ࣌఺ͷגՁͷมԽֹ 
˚TRAN  ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹͷมԽֹ 
˚NTRAN  ʹ  ඇӡ༌ࣄۀ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀརӹͷมԽֹ 
Dy  ʹ  ೥౓μϛʔ 
 
 ͜Ε·Ͱͱಉ༷ʹɺ೥౓μϛʔͱఆ਺߲Λআ͘આ໌ม਺ͱඃઆ໌ม਺͸લظ຤ͷגՁͰ
σϑϨʔτͨ͠ɻ1 ג౰ͨΓͷ֤ม਺ͷهड़౷ܭྔ͸ɺTable 13 ʹ·ͱΊͨɻฏۉ஋ͷਪ
ҠΛݟΔͱɺӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹ͸Ұ؏ͯ͠ݮӹ܏޲ʹ͋Δɻଞํɺඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹ͸Ұ؏
ͯ͠૿ӹ܏޲ʹ͋Γɺલ൒ظΑΓ΋ޙ൒ظͷ΄͏͕૿ӹ෯͸େ͖͍ɻӡ༌ࣄۀͱඇӡ༌ࣄ





Δճؼͷ݁Ռ͸ɺTable 15 ʹ·ͱΊͨɻ͜ΕʹΑΔͱɺརӹͷมԽֹ͸ɺӡ༌ࣄۀͰ΋ඇ  22
ӡ༌ࣄۀͰ΋ value relevant Ͱ͸ͳ͍ɻ͜Ε͸ɺརӹͷ૿ݮʹ͍ͨͯ͠גՁͷײԠ౓͕͖Θ
Ίͯ௿͍͜ͱΛද͓ͯ͠ΓɺརӹͷมԽֹ͸ transitory Ͱ͋Δ͜ͱΛ෺ޠ͍ͬͯΔɻ 
 Table 15 ͷ݁Ռ͔ΒɺརӹͷมԽֹʹ͸৘ใՁ஋͕ͳ͍ͱͨͩͪʹ͸͍͑ͳ͍ɻͦͷΑ
͏ͳ൑அΛ͢ΔͨΊʹ͸ɺଟ໘తͳݕ౼͕ඞཁͰ͋Δɻͦ͜Ͱɺͭ͗ʹ૿ӹͱݮӹͱʹ෼
͚ͯɺརӹͷมԽֹͷ relevance Λݕূͯ͠ΈΔɻճؼࣜ͸ɺͭ͗ͷ௨ΓͰ͋Δɻ 
 
 it N it it TRAN D TRAN P ∆ β ∆ β α ∆ 1 1 1 ′ + + =  
it y y it N it u D NTRAN D NTRAN + + ′ + + ∑β ∆ β ∆ β 2 2 2  (9) 
 
 ্هͷ DN ͸ɺݮӹαϯϓϧΛ 1ɺͦΕҎ֎Λ 0 ͱ͢Δμϛʔม਺Ͱ͋Δɻճؼͷਪఆ݁
Ռ͸ Table 16 ʹ·ͱΊͨɻશظؒͰ͸૿ӹɺݮӹͱ΋ʹ irrelevant Ͱ͋Δɻ͔͠͠ɺલ൒ظ
Ͱ͸ɺݮӹʹ͔͔Δ܎਺ 1 1 β β ′ + ͸ਖ਼Ͱɺ౷ܭతʹ༗ҙͰ͋ΔʢFʹ4.4388ɺpʹ0.037ʣ ɻ͜








௕཰ͷ value relevance ʹ͍ͭͯɺ௥Ճతͳൃݟ͸ͳ͔ͬͨɻ૯ମతʹɺརӹͷมԽֹʹ͸
transitory ͳཁૉ͕ଟؚ͘·Ε͍ͯΔͷͰ͋Ζ͏ɻ͜ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺమಓձࣾͷ৔߹ɺͦ΋ͦ΋





རӹͷ೥౓ؒ഑෼ΛΊ͙Γɺ ձܭ্ֶɺ ͜Ε·Ͱ 2 ͭͷԾઆ͕܁Γฦ͠ݕূ͞Ε͖ͯͨɻ






౓ؒ഑෼ύλʔϯʹؔ৺Λ޲͚Δͷ͸ɺ మಓྉۚͷن੍ํ͕ࣜ 1997 ೥ 3 ݄ظ·ͰͱͦΕҎ









































+ ′ + + =





β β α  (10) 














ε β β α + ′ + + =




























1  (12) 
































ϯϓϧΛ 1ɺͦΕҎ֎Λ 0 ͱ͢Δɻ͜ΕʹΑͬͯɺ੺ࣈͱࠇࣈͱͷඇରশੑɺ૿ӹͱݮӹ
ͱͷඇରশੑΛ͔֬ΊΔɻ 
 ೋ൪໨ͷϦόʔεճؼ͸ɺ جຊϞσϧͷઆ໌ม਺ͱඃઆ໌ม਺ΛೖΕସ͑ͨ΋ͷͰ͋Δɻ
͜͜Ͱͷμϛʔม਺ D1 ͸ɺઆ໌ม਺ͷגՁมԽ཰ʢ഑౰͓Αͼגࣜ෼ׂͷௐ੔ͳ͠ʣ͕ 1
ΛԼճΔ৔߹Λ 1ɺͦΕҎ֎Λ 0 ͱ͢Δ΋ͷͰ͋Δɻ͜ͷϦόʔεճؼ͸ɺใࠂ͞Εͨར
ӹͷอकੑΛ͔֬ΊΔ͍͞ʹར༻͞ΕΔ ʢBeaver et al., 1987, Collins and Kothari, 1989, Basu, 
1997, Pope and Walker, 1999, Ball et al., 2000, 2003, Cready et al., 2000, Givoly and Hayn, 2000, 
Jindrichovska and Kuo, 2002, Lee and Cao, 2002, Huijgen and Lubberink, 2003, Lara et al., 2003, 
Sivakumar and Waymire, 2003, Tazawa, 2003, Beekes et al., 2004, Bushman and Piotroski, 2004, 
Chandra et al., 2004, Francis et al. 2004, Givoly et al., 2004, Lara and Mora, 2004a, b, Roanic et 
al., 2004, Roychowdhury and Watts, 2004ʣ ɻ܎ ਺ 1 β′͸ɺ อकੑͷࣄޙࢦඪͷ 1 ͭͱ͞Εɺ Basu 
measure ͱΑ͹ΕΔ͜ͱ΋͋Δɻͨͩ͠ɺ͜ͷݚڀͰ͸ɺઌߦݚڀͱ͸ҟͳΓɺఆ਺μϛ







ӹɺӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹɺඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹͷ 3 ऀʹ͍ͭͯɺརӹͷਫ४ֹͱมԽֹͷܭ 6ʢ3
ʷ2ʣ௨ΓͰ͋Δɻ 
 ࡾ൪໨ͷϥάճؼ͸ɺجຊϞσϧͷඇઆ໌ม਺ʹ 1 ظͷϥάΛՃ͑ͨ΋ͷͰ͋Δɻ͜Ε
͸ɺձܭརӹͷద࣌ੑʢtimelinessʣͷݕূʹར༻͞ΕΔʢBeaver et al., 1980, Fama, 1990, 
Schwert, 1990, Kothari, 1992, Kothari and Sloan, 1992, Warfield and Wild, 1992, Jacobson and 
Aaker, 1993, Collins et al., 1994, Donnelly and Walker, 1995, Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995, 
Jiambalvo et al. 2002ʣ ɻ͜ͷϞσϧͰ΋ɺઆ໌ม਺͸ӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹͱඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹʹ
෼͔Εɺ͔ͭɺͦΕͧΕʹμϛʔม਺ D2 ͕෇͚ΒΕΔɻ͜Ε͸ɺརӹͷਫ४ֹʢมԽֹʣ
ͷ৔߹͸ɺଛࣦʢݮӹʣαϯϓϧΛ 1ɺͦΕҎ֎Λ 0 ͱ͢Δม਺Ͱ͋ΔɻجຊϞσϧͰར





ͨ͠μϛʔม਺ D2 ͕ར༻͞ΕΔɻ 
࠷ޙͷϦόʔεʵϥάճؼ͸ɺϥάճؼͷઆ໌ม਺ͱඃઆ໌ม਺ͱΛೖΕସ͑ͨ΋ͷͰ
͋ΔʢShroff et al., 2004ʣ ɻμϛʔม਺ D3 ͸ɺઆ໌ม਺ͷגՁมԽ཰ʢ഑౰ௐ੔ͳ͠ʣ͕ 1













σϧͷ৔߹͸ 321 ࣾʵ೥Ͱ͋Δɻ 
Table 17 ͷ Panel A ͱ Panel B ͸ɺجຊϞσϧʹΑΔ݁ՌͰ͋ΓɺA ͸རӹͷਫ४ֹΛɺ
B ͸རӹͷมԽֹΛઆ໌ม਺ͱͨ͠ͱ͖ͷճؼͷ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ Panel A1 ͷશظؒͷ݁Ռ͸ɺ
લ൒ظͱޙ൒ظͷ݁Ռ͕ࠞ߹͞Ε͍ͯΔɻӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹ͸ value relevant Ͱ͋Δɻͦͷଛ






 Panel B ͸ɺTable 16 ͱಉ͡Ͱ͋Δɻલ൒ظʹ͓͍ͯɺӡ༌ࣄۀͷݮӹ͕ persistent Ͱ͋
ΔͱධՁ͞Ε͍ͯͨ͜ͱɺ ͦΕҎ֎ͷརӹͷมԽֹʹ͸ relevance ͕؍࡯͞Εͳ͍͜ͱΛ࠶
֬ೝ͓ͯ͜͠͏ɻ ݮӹͷ relevance ͕ޙ൒ظʹͱ͘ʹߴ·ͬͨΘ͚Ͱ͸ͳ͍͔Βɺ మಓձࣾ
ͷձܭ੓ࡦ͕อकత܏޲ΛڧΊͨͱ͸͍͑ͳ͍ɻ 
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 جຊϞσϧʹ 1 ظͷϥάΛՃ͑ͨϥάճؼϞσϧͷ݁Ռ͸ɺ Table 17 ͷ Panel E ͱ F ʹ·
ͱΊΒΕ͍ͯΔɻ͜ͷϞσϧͷܾఆ܎਺͕جຊϞσϧͷͦΕΑΓ΋େ͖͘ͳΔΑ͏ͳحົ
ͳࣄଶ͸ɺੜ͍ͯ͡ͳ͍ɻPanel E ͸ɺརӹͷਫ४ֹΛઆ໌ม਺ͱͨ͠ͱ͖ͷ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ
جຊϞσϧͱಉ༷ʹɺӡ༌ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹ͸ value relevant Ͱ͋Γɺଛࣦ͕ transitory Ͱ͋
Δ͜ͱ͸ޙ൒ظͰ؍࡯͞Ε͍ͯΔɻ͜ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺޙ൒ظʹརӹͷอकੑ͕ߴ·ͬͨͱ͍͏





σϧͰ͸ଛֹࣦ͕ relevant Ͱ͋ͬͨʢPanel A2ʣͷʹ͍ͨͯ͠ɺϥάճؼϞσϧͰ͸ଛࣦ͸
גՁͱ༗ҙຯͳؔ܎͸ͳ͍ʢPanel E2ʣ ɻ͜Ε͸ɺલ൒ظͷଛࣦܭ্͸ࢢ৔Ͱࣄલʹ༧૝͞
Εͨ΋ͷͰ͸ͳ͘ɺλΠϜϦʔʹձܭ্ೝࣝ͞Ε͍ͯͨ͜ͱΛҙຯ͢Δɻ͔͠͠ɺޙ൒ظ








 Table 17ͷ Panel F͸ɺ རӹͷมԽֹΛઆ໌ม਺ͱͨ͠ϥάճؼϞσϧʹΑΔ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ
શମظؒͷ݁Ռ͸ɺޙ൒ظͷ݁Ռʹࢧ഑͞Ε͍ͯΔΑ͏Ͱ͋Δɻͦ͜Ͱɺޙ൒ظͷ݁Ռʹ
ண໨͠Α͏ɻ גՁมԽ཰͸ɺ 1 ظઌͷӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹͷมԽֹͱਖ਼ͷؔ܎ʹ͋Δɻ ͜Ε͸ɺ
ͦΕΒͷརӹͷมԽ͕ࣄલʹࢢ৔Ͱ༧૝͞Ε͍ͯͨ͜ͱΛ͍ࣔࠦͯ͠ΔɻגՁมԽͱརӹ
มԽֹͱͷ͍͋ͩͷ࣌ؒతͳζϨʹ͔Μͯ͠ɺ૿ӹͱݮӹͱͰҧ͍͸؍࡯͞Ε͍ͯͳ͍ɻ
Panel B ͷ݁Ռͱ૯߹͢Δͱɺ ʮݮӹͷใࠂ͕ޙ൒ظͰద࣌ੑΛ૿͠ɺΑΓ relevance ͕ߴΊ
ΒΕͨʯͱ͍͏Ծઆ͸ࢧ࣋͞Εͳ͍ɻͳ͓ɺ1 ظઌͷඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷ૿ӹֹ͸ɺגՁมԽ཰
ͱෛͷؔ܎ʹ͋Γɺࢢ৔Ͱ͸ଛӹͷ൓స͕༧૝͞Ε͍ͯͨͱਪଌͰ͖Δɻ 
 Panel G ͱ H ͸ɺ ϦόʔεʵϥάϞσϧʹΑΔճؼਪఆͷ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ Panel G ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺ  28






























                                                             






 ҎԼͰ͸ɺઌߦݚڀͷ Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) ʹैͬͯɺҎԼͷճؼࣜΛਪఆ͢
Δɻ 
 
 it it F it F it u TRAN EX D TRAN EX D TRAN S + + + + = _ _ _ 2 1 2 1 ∆ β ∆ β α α ∆  (14) 
 
˚S_TRAN  ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀऩӹͷมԽֹ 
˚EX_TRAN  ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀඅ༻ͷมԽֹ 




 it it F it F it u TRAN S D TRAN S D TRAN EX ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ = _ _ _ 2 1 2 1 ∆ β ∆ β α α ∆  (15) 
 
͜ΕΒͷճؼࣜ͸ɺऩӹͱඅ༻ͱͷ͍͋ͩͷײԠ౓ʢsensitivityʣͷظؒมԽΛݕূ͢Δ
΋ͷͰ͋ΔɻSivakumar and Waymire (2003)  ʹΑΔͱɺฏ४Խ͕ΑΓڧ·Δ৔߹ʹ͸ɺ(14)
ࣜͷภճؼ܎਺͸େ͖͘ͳΔͱԾఆ͞Ε͍ͯΔɻ΄ΜΒ͍ɺฏ४Խ͸࣌ܥྻͷมಈੑΛ໰
୊ʹ͢Δ΋ͷͰ͋ΓɺײԠ౓Λฏ४Խͷࢦඪͱ͢Δ͜ͱʹ͸ݕ౼ͷ༨஍͕͋ΔʢBasu, 
2003ʣ ɻ ͦͷ఺Λঝ஌ͭͭ͠΋ɺ ઌߦݚڀͷ݁Ռͱ͜͜Ͱͷ݁ՌͱΛରൺͯ͠ΈΔͷ΋༗ӹ





 Table 18 ͷ Panel A ͸(14)ࣜɺPanel B ͸(15)ࣜʹΑΔճؼͷ݁ՌΛ·ͱΊͨ΋ͷͰ͋Δɻ
͜ͷճؼϞσϧ͸෼ࢄෆۉҰͷӨڹ͕େ͖͘ɺલظ຤גՁʹΑΔσϑϨʔτͰ͸ͦΕΛ؇
࿨͢Δ͜ͱ͕Ͱ͖ͳ͔ͬͨɻ͜ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺ෼ࢄෆۉҰͷఔ౓͕΋ͬͱ΋খ͘͞ͳΔΑ͏ʹ
σϑϨʔλʔΛબ୒͠ɺ1 ג౰ͨΓͷม਺Ͱճؼͨ͠΋ͷͰ͋Δɻӡ༌ࣄۀɺඇӡ༌ࣄۀ  30






























                                                             
8  ಛఆࣄۀ͔ΒಘΒΕͨΩϟογϡΛଞͷࣄۀͷ౤ࢿ΍ܦඅͷࢧ෷͍ʹॆͯΔʮ࣮ଶ্ͷ಺෦









ۀඅ༻Λ EX_TRANɺӡ༌ࣄۀͷӦۀऩӹΛ S_TRAN ͱ͢Δɻ·ͣɺ 
 




ۀऩӹ S_NTRAN Λ௥Ճ͢Δɻ 
 





























































4 3 β β  (19) 
 
S_TRAN  ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀऩӹ 
S_NTRAN  ʹ  ඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀऩӹ 
EX_TRAN  ʹ  ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀඅ༻ 
EX_NTRAN  ʹ  ඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷ 1 ג౰ͨΓӦۀඅ༻ 
DF  ʹ 1998 ೥ 3 ݄ظҎ߱Λ 1ɺͦΕҎ֎Λ 0 ͱ͢Δظؒμϛʔ 
 
 ্هͷ(18)ࣜʹ͓͍ͯɺ NTRAN S D NTRAN S F _ _ 4 3 β β + ͸ɺඇӡ༌ࣄۀ͔Βӡ༌ࣄ
ۀʹৼΓସ͑ΒΕͨඅ༻ͷֹɺ(19)ࣜͷ TRAN S D TRAN S F _ _ 4 3 β β ′ + ′ ͸ɺӡ༌ࣄۀ͔Β
ඇӡ༌ࣄۀʹৼΓସ͑ΒΕֹͨͰ͋Δͱਪఆ͢Δ͜ͱʹ͢Δɻ྆ࣜʹ͓͍ͯӦۀऩӹͰσ
ϑϨʔτ͍ͯ͠Δͷ͸ɺن໛ʹΑΔෆۉҰ෼ࢄͷӨڹΛ؇࿨͢ΔͨΊͰ͋ΔɻTable 19 ͷ
Panel A ͸ɺ(18)ࣜͷ TRAN S _ 1 ͱ TRAN S NTRAN S _ _ ͱͷ૬ؔؔ܎ɺPanel B ͸(19)
ࣜͷ NTRAN S _ 1 ͱ NTRAN S TRAN S _ _ ͱͷ૬ؔؔ܎Λ·ͱΊͨ΋ͷͰ͋Δɻ͜Εʹ
ΑΔͱɺਂࠁͳଟॏڞઢੑΛݒ೦ͤ͞ΔΑ͏ͳߴ͍૬ؔؔ܎͸ଘࡏ͍ͯ͠ͳ͍ɻ͜ͷݚڀ
Ͱ͸ɺ (18)ࣜͱ(19)ࣜΛ SUR ͱ 2SLS Ͱਪఆͯ͠Έͨɻ ٞ࿦ͷຊ࣭ʹӨڹΛ͋ͨ͑ΔΑ͏ͳ
ҧ͍͸ੜ͡ͳ͔ͬͨͨΊɺҎԼͰ͸ɺSUR ʹΑΔਪఆ݁ՌͷΈΛهࡌ͢Δɻ 
 Table 20 ͸ɺ(18)͓Αͼ(19)ࣜͷਪఆ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ(18)ࣜͷ܎਺ 3 β ͱ 4 β ͸౷ܭతʹ༗ҙ
Ͱ͸ͳ͘ɺձܭ্ͷ಺෦ิॿʹΑΔ࠶഑෼͸ߦΘΕ͍ͯͳ͍Α͏ʹݟ͑Δɻ͔͠͠ɺ(19)
ࣜͷ 3 β′͸ 1%ਫ४Ͱ౷ܭతʹ༗ҙͳෛͷ஋Ͱ͋Γɺඇӡ༌ࣄۀ͔Βӡ༌ࣄۀ΁අ༻͕࠶഑
෼͞Ε͍ͯΔɻͨͩ͠ɺ 4 β′͸ 5%ਫ४Ͱ༗ҙͳਖ਼ͷ஋Ͱ͋Γɺ1998 ೥ 3 ݄ظҎ߱ɺͦͷৼ
ସֹ͸ݮগ͍ͯ͠Δɻ֤αϯϓϧͷৼସֹΛલظ຤גՁͰআͯ͠ج४Խ͠ɺલ൒ظͱޙ൒
ظͱͰৼସֹͷେ͖͞Λൺֱͨ͠ͱ͜ΖɺରԠͷͳ͍άϧʔϓͷ T ݕఆͰ͸ tʹ16.045ʢp
ʹ0.000ʣ ɺMann – Whitney ݕఆͰ͸ zʹ15.561ʢpʹ0.000ʣͰ͋Γɺৼସֹͷલ൒ظͱޙ൒
ظͷࠩҟ͸༗ҙͰ͋ͬͨɻͦͷΑ͏ͳมԽ͸͋Δ΋ͷͷɺશظؒΛ௨ͯ͡ɺඅ༻͸ඇӡ༌
ࣄۀ͔Βӡ༌ࣄۀ΁ɺཪฦͤ͹ɺརӹ͸ӡ༌ࣄۀ͔Βඇӡ༌ࣄۀ΁ৼΓସ͑ΒΕ͍ͯΔɻ 









 ͦ͏ͨ͠ձܭ্ͷ಺෦ิॿͷӨڹΛ͔֬Ίͨͷ͕ɺTable 21 Ͱ͋ΔɻPanel A ͸རӹճΓ
ʢaccounting yieldɿӦۀརӹʗલظ຤גՁʣ ɺPanel B ͸ϚʔδϯʢӦۀརӹʗӦۀऩӹʣ
Ͱ͋ΓɺReported ͸ใࠂ͞Εͨརӹ਺஋ʹΑͬͯܭࢉ͞Εͨ஋ɺAdjusted ͸಺෦ิॿʹΑ
ΔৼସֹΛ໭͠ೖΕͨརӹ਺஋ʹΑͬͯܭࢉ͞Εͨ஋Ͱ͋Δɻඇӡ༌ࣄۀ͔Βӡ༌ࣄۀ΁
ͷඅ༻ͷৼସʹΑͬͯɺ౰વɺӡ༌ࣄۀʢඇӡ༌ࣄۀʣͷ Reported ͷۀ੷͸ Adjusted ͷۀ
੷ΑΓ΋ѱԽ ʢ޲্ʣ ͓ͯ͠Γɺ ͦͷࠩҟ͸౷ܭతʹ༗ҙͰ͋Δɻ લ൒ظʹ͓͍ͯɺ Reported
ͷ yield ͱϚʔδϯ͸ɺӡ༌ࣄۀΑΓ΋ඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷ΄͏͕େ͖͍͕ɺAdjusted ͷۀ੷͸ɺ
ӡ༌ࣄۀͷ΄͏͕େ͖͍ɻޙ൒ظͷ yield ʹ͍ͭͯ΋ಉ༷ͷ͜ͱ͕͋ͯ͸·Δɻͨͩ͠ɺ




6.2 ಺෦ิॿͱརӹͷ relevance 
 લ߲Ͱਪఆͨ͠ձܭ্ͷ಺෦ิॿ͸ɺརӹͷ value relevance ʹͲͷΑ͏ͳӨڹΛ͋ͨ͑
͍ͯΔͷ͔ɺͦΕ͕ͭ͗ͷݕূ՝୊Ͱ͋Δɻ͜͜Ͱ͸ӡ༌ࣄۀͱඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷӦۀརӹʹ
͍ͭͯɺใࠂ͞Εͨ਺஋ʹΑΔճؼͱɺ಺෦ิॿΛमਖ਼ͨ͠਺஋ʹΑΔճؼΛࢼΈͨɻલ
ऀͷ݁Ռ͸Table 22ͷ Reportedͷྻʹɺ ޙऀͷ݁Ռ͸Adjustedͷྻʹهࡌ͞Ε͍ͯΔɻ Panel 
A ͸ɺ2 ͭͷࣄۀͷӦۀརӹʹΑΔճؼͷ݁ՌͰ͋ΓɺPanel B ͸ଛࣦαϯϓϧʹμϛʔΛ
෇͚ͨճؼͷ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻ Panel A ʹΑΔͱɺ རӹͷ value relevance ͸ɺ Reported ΋ Adjusted
΋େ͖ͳҧ͍͸ͳ͍ɻ͜ͷ݁Ռ͸ɺ͜͜Ͱਪఆ͞Εͨ಺෦ิॿʹΑͬͯ͸ɺ౤ࢿՈ͸ޡಋ
͞Εͳ͍͜ͱΛ͍ࣔࠦͯ͠Δɻ 
ڵຯਂ͍ͷ͸ɺPanel B ͷ݁ՌͰ͋Δɻશظؒͷ݁Ռʹ͓͍ͯɺReported ͷӡ༌ࣄۀͷଛ
                                                             
9  ਖ਼֬ʹ͸ɺ1997 ೥ 1 ݄ʹ্ݶՁ੍͕֨ಋೖ͞Εɺమಓࣄۀ๏ͷ 2000 ೥վਖ਼ʹ͓͍ͯɺϠʔ
υεςΟοΫํ͕ࣜಋೖ͞Ε͍ͯΔɻ   34
ࣦαϯϓϧʹ͸ transitory ͳཁૉؚ͕·Ε͍ͯΔͱਪఆ͞Ε͍ͯΔͷʹ͍ͨͯ͠ɺAdjusted









ձܭ্ͷৼସૢ࡞͕ɺ ӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹͷ relevance ΛߴΊ͍ͯΔ͜ͱΛ͍ࣔࠦͯ͠Δɻ ͜ͷ
܏޲͸ɺଛࣦμϛʔΛআ͍ͨ Panel A Ͱ΋؍࡯Ͱ͖Δɻ 
ͭ͗ʹɺརӹͷৼସֹΛ SHIFTʢʼ0ʣͱ͠ɺͦͷ relevance Λݕূͯ͠ΈΑ͏ɻCollins 
et al. (1998) Ͱ͸ɺརӹͷৼସΛ͍ͯ͠Δ͔൱͔ͰαϯϓϧΛαϒɾάϧʔϓʹ෼͚ɺά
ϧʔϓɾμϛʔΛར༻͢Δ͜ͱͰɺརӹͷৼସͷ relevance Λݕূ͍ͯ͠Δɻͦ͜Ͱ͸ɺৼ
ସֹͷ relevance ͸෼ੳ͞Ε͍ͯͳ͍ɻ ͜͜Ͱͷ෼ੳ͸ɺ ͦͷΑ͏ͳؒ઀తͳݕূͰ͸ͳ͘ɺ








 it it it it it it u SHIFT NTRAN ADJ SHIFT TRAN ADJ P + + + − + = ) _ ( ) _ ( 2 1 β β α  
it it it it u SHIFT NTRAN ADJ TRAN ADJ + + + + = γ β β α _ _ 2 1  (20) 
 








શظؒʹ͓͍ͯ SHIFT ʹ͔͔Δ܎਺͸༗ҙͳϓϥεͷ஋Ͱ͋Δ͕ɺ ͦΕ͸ޙ൒ظͷ݁Ռ
ʹࢧ഑͞Ε͍ͯΔΑ͏Ͱ͋Δɻޙ൒ظʹ͓͍ͯɺͦͷ܎਺͸ɺӡ༌ࣄۀͱඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷར
ӹͷ܎਺ͷࠩΑΓ΋େ͖͍ʢFʹ12.924ɺpʹ0.000ʣ ɻલ൒ظؒʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺͦ΋ͦ΋ӡ༌
ࣄۀͱඇӡ༌ࣄۀͷརӹ͕༗ҙͳม਺Ͱ͸ͳ͘ɺSHIFT ͷ relevance Λޙ൒ظͱൺֱ͢Δ
͜ͱ͕Ͱ͖ͳ͍ɻ͕ͨͬͯ͠ɺલड़ͷΑ͏ʹ SHIFT ͷֹ͕ޙ൒ظʹݮগͨ͜͠ͱͱɺޙ൒
ظʹͦΕ͕ relevant ʹͳΔ͜ͱͱͷؔ܎ʹ͍ͭͯ͸ɺ ͖͋Β͔ͳ͜ͱ͸͍͑ͳ͍ɻ Ή͠Ζɺ
ن໛͕ॖখ͞Εͨޙ൒ظͰ͋ͬͯ΋ɺ ෦໳ؒͷඅ༻ৼସֹ͸ value relevant Ͱ͋Δ఺ʹ஫໨
͍ͨ͠ɻྉۚऩೖͷ֬อʹͭͳ͕Δӡ༌ࣄۀ΁ͷඅ༻ৼସ͸ɺاۀՁ஋Λ૿Ճ͍ͤͯ͞Δ
Θ͚Ͱ͋Δɻ 
 Table 22 ͱ 23 ͷ݁Ռ͸૯ͯ͡ɺ ձܭ্ͷ಺෦ิॿ͕ใࠂ͞ΕΔձܭརӹͷ৘ใՁ஋Λ௿












 ͜ͷݚڀͰ͸ɺమಓ֤ࣾͷଟ֯Խࣄۀʹண໨ͯ͠ɺηάϝϯτ৘ใͷ value relevance Λ
ݕূͨ͠ɻ మಓձࣾͰ͸ɺ మಓͳͲͷӡ༌ࣄۀͱෆಈ࢈ࣄۀ͕ऩӹͷೋຊபͱͳ͓ͬͯΓɺ
                                                             
10  ྉۚن੍ࣄۀͱඇن੍ࣄۀͱͷ͍͋ͩͷձܭ্ͷ಺෦ิॿ͸ɺ اۀͷגओͱফඅऀͱͷ͍͋
ͩͷ෋ͷ෼഑ؔ܎ʹӨڹΛ͋ͨ͑Δɻ·ͨɺ͜͜ͰऔΓ্͛ͨ໰୊͸ɺن੍౰ہͷϞχλϦϯ
άೳྗΛΊ͙Δ໰୊Ͱ΋͋Δɻ͔͠͠ɺ͍ͣΕͷ໰୊΋͜ͷ࿦จͷൣғ֎Ͱ͋Δɻ   36
ͦΕΒͷӦۀརӹʢηάϝϯτརӹʣ͸͍ͣΕ΋ value relevant Ͱ͋ͬͨɻͦΕΒҎ֎ͷ෭
࣍తࣄۀͷརӹʹ͸ relevance ͸؍࡯͞Εͳ͔ͬͨɻͨͩ͠ɺͦͷݕূ݁Ռ͕ɺձܭج४͕
















 ͜ͷݚڀͰ͸ɺ ෼ੳظؒΛ͘͝େ௫Έʹલ൒ظͱޙ൒ظʹ 2 ෼ͨ͠ɻ རӹ৘ใͷ relevance
͸؀ڥ৚݅ʹґଘ͠ɺ࣌୅ͱͱ΋ʹมԽ͢Δ͜ͱΛ҉໧ͷ͏ͪʹલఏͱͨ͠͏͑Ͱɺલ൒
ظͱޙ൒ظͱͰ͸మಓྉۚͷن੍ํ͕ࣜҟͳ͍ͬͯΔ͔ΒͰ͋Δɻ͜ͷݚڀͰ͸ɺલ൒ظ






















ͷ management approach ͷಋೖ͸ɺະ஌ͷ໰୊Λ௥Ճ͍ͯ͠Δ͔΋͠Εͳ͍ɻͦΕ͸ɺཧ
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Table 1    Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A1: 1991 – 2004       
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev.  N 
P  33,609.0640   382.2500  540.0000  944.5000  136,754.6209   348
OP  5,190.9874   28.7108  40.5825  55.5730  23,030.3784   348
TRAN  4,498.7937   8.8026  17.4399  31.0660  20,897.1681   348
REST  425.5517   12.4388  18.1139  26.6438  1,676.1809   344
LSUR  6.2562   - 5.5430  - 0.0057  2.9725  87.9421   246
RTAL  146.1619   0.2856  2.1808  4.7804  845.9927   263
CONS  3.6298   0.4949  2.1852  6.6457  7.8794    74
MISC  265.0359   0.6655  2.0336  3.8529  1,063.9230   305
Panel A2: 1991 – 1997       
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev.  N 
P  10,943.6442   517.5000  638.0000  922.5000  66,560.6754   163
OP  1,932.6132   31.4893  41.7492  51.4037  13,524.6703   163
TRAN  1,744.8237   7.5385  15.1044  23.8148  12,729.5759   163
REST  56.3617   13.0043  18.6765  26.6378  125.9558   160
LSUR  26.0371   - 3.2112  0.8145  4.6306  118.8635   113
RTAL  - 29.2177   0.2922  2.1342  5.0066  209.1489   120
CONS  7.7078   1.7418  5.8968  10.2853  8.4612    27
MISC  154.6412   0.7807  1.8537  3.4205  1,039.1790   142
Panel A3: 1998 – 2004       
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev.  N 
P  64,176.7784   326.0000  418.0000  1,170.0000  186,500.6196   185
OP  10,395.7859   26.6183  38.8352  57.9967  32,413.1738   185
TRAN  9,175.5509   10.6587  19.8923  34.0059  29,788.8449   185
REST  746.5865   11.3382  17.6348  28.3411  2,239.9366   184
LSUR  - 10.5500   - 6.2186  - 1.9038  1.7352  41.0589   133
RTAL  293.3336   0.1348  2.1871  4.2033  1,110.0073   143
CONS  1.2871   0.2939  1.4259  2.4671  6.4484    47
MISC  361.2080   0.4500  2.0579  4.3479  1,075.8257   163
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Table  1  Descriptive  statistics (continued) 
Panel B1: 1991 – 2004       
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev.  N 
TRAN  0.0723   0.0322  0.0751  0.1208  0.0722   348
REST  0.2550   0.1761  0.2382  0.3159  0.1194   344
LSUR  - 0.0128   - 0.0518  - 0.0002  0.0257  0.0800   246
RTAL  0.0114   0.0018  0.0102  0.0185  0.0171   263
CONS  0.0138   0.0055  0.0125  0.0251  0.0219    74
MISC  0.0373   0.0165  0.0315  0.0458  0.0477   305
Panel B2: 1991 – 1997       
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev.  N 
TRAN  0.0723   0.0322  0.0751  0.1208  0.0722   348
REST  0.2976   0.2184  0.2762  0.3808  0.1232   160
LSUR  - 0.0021   - 0.0512  0.0074  0.0439  0.0920   113
RTAL  0.0122   0.0021  0.0110  0.0182  0.0154   120
CONS  0.0237   0.0107  0.0191  0.0388  0.0216    27
MISC  0.0464   0.0205  0.0335  0.0605  0.0507   142
Panel B3: 1998 – 2004       
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev.  N 
TRAN  0.0835   0.0397  0.0848  0.1347  0.0764   185
REST  0.2180   0.1538  0.2020  0.2505  0.1025   184
LSUR  - 0.0219   - 0.0534  - 0.0150  0.0186  0.0668   133
RTAL  0.0107   0.0010  0.0101  0.0186  0.0184   143
CONS  0.0081   0.0041  0.0108  0.0203  0.0199    47
MISC  0.0294   0.0139  0.0301  0.0376  0.0434   163
P = stock price, OP = operating profits (consolidated base), TRAN = operating profits in transportation segment, REST = operating 
profits in real estate segment, LSUR = operating profits in leisure segment, RTAL = operating profits in retail segment, CONS = 
operating profits in construction segment, MISC = operating profits in other segment. 
Panel A represents the per share values (yen) and Panel B represents the profit margin (operating profits / sales and 
revenues). 
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Table 2    Correlations between operating profits in segments 
Panel A: 1991 – 2004       
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Panel B: 1991 – 1997       
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Panel C: 1998 – 2004       
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Table 3    Value relevance of operating profits 
Panel A: 1991 – 2004 
















       1 8 . 5 6 2  
0.4147 
(2)   0.5485 
(3.401) 
[0.001] 
      16.806 
0.3894 






     16.828 
0.4062 
(4)   0.6460 
(3.614) 
[0.000] 
 -  0.7075 
(- 1.040) 
[0.299] 
    15.823 
0.3905 
(5)   0.5354 
(3.264) 
[0.001] 
   0.9762 
(0.768) 
[0.443] 
   15.693 
0.3884 
(6)   0.5307 
(3.303) 
[0.001] 










































Panel B: 1991 – 1997 
















       2 2 . 3 3 7  
0.4797 
(2)   0.4476 
(2.021) 
[0.045] 
      22.524 
0.4819 






     19.608 
0.4789 






    19.590 
0.4786 
(5)   0.4453 
(1.990) 
[0.048] 
   -  0.6567 
(- 0.410) 
[0.682] 
   19.601 
0.4788 
(6)   0.4505 
(2.039) 
[0.043] 
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Table 3    Value relevance of operating profits (continued) 





































Panel C: 1998 – 2004 
















       1 4 . 3 4 3  
0.3367 
(2)   0.5779 
(2.892) 
[0.004] 
      11.471 
0.2849 






     12.535 
0.3340 
(4)   0.7468 
(3.409) 
[0.001] 
 -  1.0595 
(- 1.360) 
[0.175] 
    10.412 
0.2904 
(5)   0.5481 
(2.627) 
[0.009] 
   1.6284 
(0.931) 
[0.353] 
   10.125 
0.2841 
(6)   0.5395 
(2.695) 
[0.008] 










































Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
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Table 4    Value relevance of operating profits with loss dummies 
  A. 1991 – 2004    B. 1991 – 1997    C. 1998 – 2004   








































DL 2*LSUR  - 3.7933 
(- 2.180) 
[0.030] 
 -  7.7151 
(- 2.329) 
[0.021] 














DL 3*RTAL  0.0156 
(0.005) 
[0.996] 
 -  3.2986 
(- 0.578) 
[0.564] 




CONS  2.9109 
(1.112) 
[0.267] 

















MISC  1.4837 
(1.737) 
(0.083) 







DL 5*MISC  0.0188 
(0.006) 
[0.995] 







F  11.423   9.311    6.699   
Adj. R2  0.4189   0.4659   0.3449  
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).    DL = a dummy variable, which is 1 for loss samples and 0 for others. 
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Table 5    Descriptive statistics of sales and revenues in segments 
   Mean  1Q Median 3Q St.  Dev.  N 
S_TRAN  31,591.0063   189.9164  249.4567  506.4592  115,921.1337   348
S_REST  2,025.3704   47.8586  72.6469  162.5866  7,727.4112   344
S_LSUR  669.9970   74.4195  108.3354  164.2291  2,195.0572   246
S_RTAL  8,182.8338   128.7603  289.9271  380.0518  26,155.4416   263
S_CONS  248.1455   103.3130  159.7760  354.5216  193.3732    74
S_MISC  6,183.1267   33.7770  66.6557  112.3883  22,700.2193   306
   Mean  1Q Median 3Q St.  Dev.  N 
S_TRAN  9,493.4971   186.7421  232.5145  336.3755  63,478.2136   169
S_REST  269.6171   44.8990  62.3681  145.9522  621.4868   160
S_LSUR  824.7545   68.6719  101.2443  164.2468  2,639.7461   113
S_RTAL  2,565.7692   115.9612  289.8820  383.2305  13,974.4112   120
S_CONS  329.3433   130.7354  217.1947  492.1483  247.4866    27
S_MISC  1,579.1447   27.8969  55.8779  102.2486  10,287.2725   142
   Mean  1Q Median 3Q St.  Dev.  N 
S_TRAN  51,060.7037   193.1954  257.9687  544.8170  144,629.9343   185
S_REST  3,552.1124   51.7983  96.1314  180.0946  10,309.6917   184
S_LSUR  538.5113   81.5305  119.5873  157.2022  1,718.7092   133
S_RTAL  12,896.4545   143.1781  290.2791  374.1635  32,335.9441   143
S_CONS  201.4999   94.9726  144.5479  330.8648  133.1357    47
S_MISC  10,056.4862   40.5736  75.3850  129.9228  28,770.7954   164
S_TRAN = sales and revenues in transportation segment, S_REST = sales and revenues in real estate segment, S_LSUR = sales and 
revenues in leisure segment, S_RTAL = sales and revenues in retail segment, S_CONS = sales and revenues in construction 
segment, S_MISC = sales and revenues in other segment.    All numbers are per share values (yen). 
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Table 6    Correlations between sales and revenues in segments 
Panel A: 1991 – 2004       













S_REST  0.615 


















































- 0. 033 
(0.544) 
 
Panel B: 1991 – 1997       













S_REST  0.625 





















































Panel C: 1998 – 2004       













S_REST  0.594 
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Table 7    Value relevance of sales and revenues in segments 
Panel A: 1991 – 2004 



































   0.0468 
(1.940) 
[0.053] 















































Panel B: 1991 – 1997 






















     19.132 
0.4724 






    18.920 
0.4695 
(4) -  0.0012 
(- 0.033) 
[0.974] 
   0.0076 
(0.238) 
[0.812] 
   18.776 
0.4675 
(5) -  0.0031 
(- 0.091) 
[0.928] 
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Table 7    Value relevance of sales and revenues in segments (continued) 
Panel C: 1998 – 2004 



































   0.0729 
(2.250) 
[0.026] 















































Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
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Table 8    Comparison in explanatory power between regression models (1) 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3      Model 4 
Panel A: 1991 – 2004      
          AIC  - 3.6891  - 3.7504  - 3.7396  - 3.7306 
     R2   0.4197   0.4383   0.4483   0.4591 
      vs.  Model  1      
     Vuong’s  z     0.7885   1.3215   1.7719 
     p-value     0.4304   0.1863   0.0764 
Panel B: 1991 – 1997      
          AIC  - 3.8316  - 3.8841  - 3.8308  - 3.8018 
     R2   0.5066   0.5022   0.5062   0.5219 
      vs.  Model  1      
     Vuong’s  z    - 0.2469  - 0.0251    0.7921 
     p-value     0.8050   0.9800   0.4283 
Panel C: 1998 – 2004      
          AIC  - 3.5591  - 3.6407  - 3.6348  - 3.6032 
     R2   0.3441   0.3619   0.3919   0.4055 
      vs.  Model  1      
     Vuong’s  z     0.3733   0.1223   1.4484 
     p-value     0.7089   0.9026   0.1475 
Stock prices are regressed on as follows, 
Model 1: the independent variable is consolidated operating profits. 
Model 2: the independent variables are sales and revenues in each segment. 
Model 3: the independent variables are operating profits in each segment. 
Model 4: the independent variables are operating profits in each segment and the product of loss dummy and operating profits. 
   57
Table 9    Value relevance of margin dummies 
  A. 1991 – 2004  B. 1991 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 
  A1 A2  B1 B2  C1 C2 


























































































DL*LSUR   0.0210 
(0.009) 
[0.993] 
 -  3.0245 
(- 0.757) 
[0.451] 
 -  0.4222 
(- 0.134) 
[0.894] 












































































































F  11.879 11.368  9.382  8.853  7.298  6.852 
Adj. R2  0.4294 0.4276  0.4680 0.4660  0.3678 0.3641 
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).  DL = a dummy variable, which is 1 for loss samples and 0 for others.  DMG  = a 
dummy variable, which is 1 for samples that realize the higher margin in each segment than transportation segment in the year and 0 
for others. 
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Table 10    Value relevance of ROA dummies and asset growth dummies 
  A. Basic      B. ROA (1)     C. ROA (2)   D. Asset Growth 
TRAN  0.9887 
(4.903) 
[0.000] 
TRAN  0.9323 
(3.009) 
[0.003] 
TRAN  1.0462 
(3.290) 
[0.001] 
TRAN  0.9585 
(4.518) 
[0.000] 
REST  0.7504 
(1.869) 
[0.063] 
REST  1.1722 
(2.091) 
[0.038] 
REST  1.0873 
(1.927) 
[0.055] 
REST  0.7006 
(1.693) 
[0.092] 
   DRA 1*REST  - 0.5790 
(- 1.036) 
[0.302] 
DRA 1*REST - 0.5015 
(- 0.892) 
[0.374] 
DAG 1*REST  - 0.0766 
(- 0.160) 
[0.873] 
LSUR  0.0292 
(0.046) 
[0.963] 
LSUR  - 0.2482 
(- 0.364) 
[0.716] 
LSUR  1.6509 
(1.247) 
[0.214] 
LSUR  - 0.3257 
(- 0.381) 
[0.704] 
    DRA 2*LSUR  2.6879 
(2.051) 
[0.041] 
DRA 2*LSUR 1.0358 
(0.654) 
[0.514] 
DAG 2*LSUR  0.9163 
(0.868) 
[0.386] 
        DL*LSUR  - 2.7505 
(- 1.489) 
[0.138] 
   
RTAL  0.9405 
(0.693) 
[0.489] 
RTAL  - 0.5108 
(- 0.268) 
[0.789] 
RTAL  - 0.5931 
(- 0.314) 
[0.754] 
RTAL  0.9039 
(0.510) 
[0.611] 
    DRA 3*RTAL  1.8040 
(0.646) 
[0.519] 
DRA 3*RTAL 2.0787 
(0.748) 
[0.455] 
DAG 3*RTAL  - 0.2792 
(- 0.104) 
[0.917] 
CONS  4.4644 
(1.353) 
[0.177] 
CONS  4.1031 
(1.036) 
[0.301] 
CONS  4.0087 
(1.057) 
[0.291] 
CONS  5.2265 
(1.585) 
[0.114] 
    DRA 4*CONS  - 1.6361 
(- 0.296) 
[0.768] 
DRA 4*CONS - 1.2917 
(- 0.239) 
[0.812] 
DAG 4*CONS  - 12.360 
(- 1.971) 
[0.050] 
MISC  1.9708 
(2.118) 
[0.035] 
MISC  5.2748 
(0.997) 
[0.320] 
MISC  4.8329 
(0.903) 
[0.368] 
MISC  1.6391 
(1.908) 
[0.058] 
    DRA 5*MISC  - 2.7883 
(- 0.491) 
[0.624] 
DRA 5*MISC - 2.9492 
(- 0.520) 
[0.603] 
DAG 5*MISC  2.5379 
(1.095) 
[0.275] 
F  10.895  F  8.239  F  7.922  F  8.089 
Adj. R2  0.3739  Adj. R2  0.3722  Adj. R2  0.3737  Adj. R2  0.3673 
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).  DL = a dummy variable, which is 1 for loss samples and 0 for others.  DRA  = a 
dummy variable, which is 1 for samples that realize the higher ROA in each segment than transportation segment in the year and 0 
for others.    DAG  = a dummy variable, which is 1 for samples where the asset-growth-ratio in each segment is higher than 
transportation segment in the year and 0 for others. 
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Table 11    Correlations between operating profits plus depreciation 
  TRAN_DP REST_DP LSUR_DP RTAL_DP CONS_DP MISC_DP 
















































 -  0.052 
(0.430) 











TRAN_DP = operating profits plus depreciation in transportation segment, REST_DP = operating profits plus depreciation in real 
estate segment, LSURDP = operating profits plus depreciation in leisure segment, RTAL_DP = operating profits plus depreciation 
in retail segment, CONS_DP = operating profits i plus depreciation n construction segment, MISC_DP = operating profits plus 
depreciation in other segment. 
 
 
Table 12    Comparison in explanatory power between regression models (2) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  



























































F  3.744 10.895  11.645 
Adj. R2  0.2504 0.3739 0.3911 
1)  Sales  &  Revenues  vs.  Operating  Profits: 
2)  Sales  &  Revenues  vs.  Operating  Profits  plus  Depreciation: 
3)  Operating  Profits  vs.  Operating  Profits  plus  Depreciation: 
Vuong’s z = 2.1718    (p = 0.0299) 
Vuong’s z = 2.3963    (p = 0.0166) 
Vuong’s z = 0.9424    (p = 0.3460) 
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).   60
Table 13    Descriptive statistics of changes in operating profits 
Panel A: 1992 – 2004      
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev. 
∆P  1,156.2368  - 107.0000 - 27.0000 31.0000  27,656.5339
∆TRAN  - 126.9348  - 2.9135 0.5874 4.8410  1,664.8448
∆NTRAN  106.7716  - 5.5243 - 0.4539 3.9957  570.3334
Panel B: 1992 – 1997      
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev. 
∆P  518.2950   - 124.0000  - 53.0000  26.0000   11,290.2232 
∆TRAN  - 18.4841   - 3.3781  0.1643  3.8442   128.6480 
∆NTRAN  7.5743   - 7.0215  - 1.8449  1.8447   142.5910 
Panel C: 1998 – 2004      
 Mean  1Q  Median  3Q  St.  Dev. 
∆P  1,643.4560   - 85.7500  - 9.5000  34.0000   35,371.6328 
∆TRAN  - 209.7625   - 2.8838  0.6276  5.7537   2,204.5587 
∆NTRAN  182.5321   - 3.9604  0.4074  6.4061   738.1905 
P = stock price, TRAN = operating profits in transportation segment, NTRAN = operating profits in non-transportasion segments.  
∆X = Xt – Xt-1.    All numbers are per share values (yen). 
 
 
Table 14    Correlations between changes in operating profits 
    A. 1992 – 2004  B. 1992 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 
 Coefficients  p-value Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Pearson  -  0.450 (0.000) -  0.738 (0.000) -  0.383 (0.000) 
Spearman  - 0.114  (0.041)  - 0.402  (0.000)  - 0.031  (0.674) 




Table 15    Value relevance of changes in operating profits 
    A. 1992 – 2004  B. 1992 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 


















F  13.729 17.877  9.617 
Adj. R2  0.3577 0.4612 0.2758 
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
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Table 16    Value relevance of positive and negative changes in operating profits 
    A. 1992 – 2004  B. 1992 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 






































F  11.955 14.357  7.666 
Adj. R2  0.3539 0.4656 0.2692 
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).    DN = a dummy variable, which is 1 for samples of negative change and 0 for others. 
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Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing 
Indep. Var. 
 
TRANt / Pt-1  DN 1*TRANt / Pt-1 NTRANt / Pt-1  DN 2*NTRAN t / Pt-1  F 
Adj. R2 
Panel A1: 1991 – 2004       














Panel A2: 1991 – 1997       














Panel A3: 1998 – 2004       
















OPt / Pt-1  DN *TOP t / Pt-1     F 
Adj. R2 
Panel A4: 1992 – 2004       






   18.135 
0.4255 
Panel A5: 1992 – 1997       






   19.445 
0.4767 
Panel A6: 1998 – 2004       






   14.137 
0.3635 
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Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing  (continued) 
Indep. Var. 
  ∆TRANt / Pt-1  D’N 1*∆TRAN t / Pt-1  ∆NTRAN t / Pt-1  D’N 2*∆NTRAN t / Pt-1 
F 
Adj. R2 
Panel B1: 1992 – 2004       














Panel B2: 1992 – 1997       














Panel B3: 1998 – 2004       















  ∆OPt / Pt-1  D’N *∆TOP t / Pt-1     F 
Adj. R2 
Panel B4: 1992 – 2004       






   13.532 
0.3541 
Panel B5: 1992 – 1997       






   18.971 
0.4769 
Panel B6: 1998 – 2004       






   8.859 
0.2578 
   64
Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing  (continued) 
Indep. Var.
 
Pt / Pt-1  D*(Pt / Pt-1)  F 
Adj. R2 
Panel C1: 1991 – 2004     
























Panel C2: 1991 – 1997     
























Panel C3: 1998 – 2004     
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Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing  (continued) 
Indep. Var.
 
Pt / Pt-1  D*(Pt / Pt-1)  F 
Adj. R2 
Panel D1: 1992 – 2004     



























Panel D2: 1992 – 1997     



























Panel D3: 1998 – 2004     
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Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing  (continued) 
Indep. Var. 
 
TRANt / Pt-2  DN 1*TRANt / Pt-2 NTRANt / Pt-2  DN 2*NTRAN t / Pt-2  F 
Adj. R2 
Panel E1: 1991 – 2004       














Panel E2: 1991 – 1997       














Panel E3: 1998 – 2004       
















OPt / Pt-2  DN *OP t / Pt-2     F 
Adj. R2 
Panel E4: 1992 – 2004       






   14.517 
0.3708 
Panel E5: 1992 – 1997       






   16.260 
0.4313 
Panel E6: 1998 – 2004       






   10.157 
0.2870 
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Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing  (continued) 
Indep. Var. 
  ∆TRANt / Pt-2  D’N 1*∆TRAN t / Pt-2  ∆NTRAN t / Pt-2  D’N 2*∆NTRAN t / Pt-2 
F 
Adj. R2 
Panel F1: 1992 – 2004       














Panel F2: 1992 – 1997       














Panel F3: 1998 – 2004       















  ∆OPt / Pt-2  D’N *∆OP t / Pt-2     F 
Adj. R2 
Panel F4: 1992 – 2004       






   13.433 
0.3523 
Panel F5: 1992 – 1997       






   20.514 
0.4974 
Panel F6: 1998 – 2004       






   6.755 
0.2028 
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Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing  (continued) 
Indep. Var.
 
Pt / Pt-2  D*(Pt / Pt-2)  F 
Adj. R2 
Panel G1: 1991 – 2004     
























Panel G2: 1991 – 1997     
























Panel G3: 1998 – 2004     
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Table  17  Conservatism  and  income  smoothing  (continued) 
Indep. Var.
 
Pt / Pt-2  D*(Pt / Pt-2)  F 
Adj. R2 
Panel H1: 1992 – 2004     



























Panel H2: 1992 – 1997     



























Panel H3: 1998 – 2004     



























Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).    DN = a dummy variable, which is 1 for samples of negative levels (changes) and 0 for 
others.  D = a dummy variable, which is 1 for samples of stock price down and 0 for others. 
   70
Table  18  Relationship  between  operating revenues and expenses 
Panel A1 
 
DF  ∆EX_TRAN  DF*∆EX_TRAN 
F 
Adj. R2 













DF  ∆EX_NTRAN  DF*∆EX_NTRAN 
F 
Adj. R2 













DF  ∆S_TRAN  DF*∆S_TRAN 
F 
Adj. R2 













DF  ∆S_NTRAN  DF*∆S_NTRAN 
F 
Adj. R2 











EX and S represent operating expenses, sales and revenues, respectively.  DF = a dummy period for 1 after March 1998 and 0 for 
others. 
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Table 19    Correlations between variables in WLS 
    A. 1991 – 2004    B. 1991 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 
Panel A:  Coefficients  p-value Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Pearson  - 0.073  0.171  0.007  0.931  - 0.131  0.076 
Spearman  0.054 0.314 0.066 0.403 0.069 0.353 
Panel B:  Coefficients  p-value Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Pearson  0.347 0.000 0.306 0.000 0.352 0.000 
Spearman  0.361 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.323 0.000 
Above table represents the correlations between the reverse of sales and revenues in transportation segment and the sales and 
revenues in non-transportation segments divided by sales and revenues in transportation segment. 
 
 
Table 20    Cross subsidization between transportation and non-transportation segments 







DF  - 0.0264 
(- 2.11) 
[0.035] 
DF  0.0186 
(2.54) 
[0.011] 
1 / S_TRAN  1,199.277 
(8.59) 
[0.000] 
1 / S_NTRAN  - 437.5262 
(- 3.77) 
[0.000] 
DF* (1 / S_TRAN)  - 38.3781 
(- 0.21) 
[0.830] 
DF* (1 / S_NTRAN)  - 212.0582 
(- 1.57) 
[0.117] 
S_NTRAN / S_TRAN  - 0.0042 
(- 1.11) 
[0.268] 
S_TRAN / S_NTRAN  - 0.0294 
(- 4.38) 
[0.000] 
DF* S_NTRAN / S_TRAN  0.0016 
(0.32) 
[0.750] 
DF* S_TRAN / S_NTRAN  0.0173 
(2.29) 
[0.022] 








R-square 0.3612    0.3725 
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = z-value by SUR estimation, [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
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Table 21    The effects of cross subsidization 
Panel A: Yield        Transportation          Non-transportation     
   Reported  difference  Adjusted Reported difference  Adjusted 
Period I 

































   7.065*** 













































Panel B: Margin        Transportation          Non-transportation     
   Reported  difference  Adjusted Reported difference  Adjusted 
Period I 

























 -  3.151*** 
 -  3.073*** 
3.000* 
 -  0.870 
 0.768 
  3.000* 
0.146 
   5.993*** 
2.125 
    2.007** 
   3.351*** 
0.983 
Period II 









































Panel A represents the yield (operating profits / stock price of the previous year end).    Panel B represents the margin (operating profits / sales and revenues).    ***significant at the 1% level (two tailed) 
** significant at the 5% level (two tailed)    * significant at the 10% level (two tailed) 
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Table 22    Value relevance of adjusted operating profits 
Panel A    A. 1991 – 2004  B. 1991 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 
  Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted 




































F  17.207 17.173 19.641 19.697 12.692 12.493 
Adj. R2  0.4120 0.4115 0.4793 0.4801 0.3370 0.3332 
Panel B    A. 1991 – 2004  B. 1991 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 
  Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted 








































































F  15.815 15.701 15.974 15.841 11.272 11.495 
Adj. R2  0.4206 0.4187 0.4803 0.4781 0.3583 0.3632 
Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).    DL = a dummy variable, which is 1 for loss samples and 0 for others. 
 
 
Table 23    Value relevance of transferred operating profits 
    A. 1991 – 2004  B. 1991 – 1997  C. 1998 – 2004 



























F  16.381 17.416 13.161 
Adj. R2  0.4149 0.4770 0.3730 
SHIFT = the transferred earnings from transportation segments to non-transportation segment.   ADJ_TRAN = TRAN – SHIFT, 
ADJ_NTRAN = NTRAN + SHIFT.  Each cell shows as follows: Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White’s t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
 
 